Spain's data protection authority on November 17, 2026 published a legal criterion holding that a risk analysis cannot automatically take the place of a data protection impact assessment, drawing the point from the €500,000 fine it imposed on FC Barcelona over a biometric membership census. The note, which sits in the "Criterios jurídicos" section of the Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) website, does not name the club. It refers to "an entity" that asked members to verify themselves with a selfie, and it links to sanctioning procedure PS/00450/2024, whose 139-page resolution names Fútbol Club Barcelona throughout.

The note is titled "Necesidad de evaluación de impacto en los sistemas biométricos de autenticación" - "The need for an impact assessment in biometric authentication systems". On November 18, Luis Alberto Montezuma, who works in data and privacy policy and labels his LinkedIn posts as personal opinion, shared the decision with a 21-page unofficial English translation of pages 100 to 127 of the resolution, the part that deals with the impact assessment. The translation does not name its translator. Quotations from the resolution's impact assessment reasoning below follow that unofficial translation. Quotations from the AEPD note and from other parts of the resolution are PPC Land translations from the Spanish.

In Short

Spain's privacy regulator has published a short note explaining why FC Barcelona was fined €500,000 for using selfie and voice checks on its members without a proper impact assessment. The point reaches far beyond football: any organisation that adopts biometric logins, and decides on paper that no impact assessment is needed, must be able to prove that decision with evidence. A risk report written after the vendor contracts are signed, with unexplained scores, does not count, even when the biometric data was not yet treated as sensitive at the time.

What the AEPD published

The note opens with a disclaimer: the summaries in that section "cannot be considered the official publication of a public document", and the binding text is the resolution itself. What follows is a compressed restatement of the agency's reasoning, aimed at a question that, according to the AEPD, "is often raised" by controllers that deployed biometric authentication before the European Data Protection Board's position on biometrics changed.

Its central passage is about timing and probability. "The resolution clarifies that what matters is that the prior risk analysis shows there is a likelihood of high risk, without it being necessary to confirm that it occurs, since it is not possible to verify this until the material execution of the processing begins," the note states. It continues: "risk analyses are not a mere document or a mere formality, and cannot automatically replace the impact assessment, as the entity argued."

The burden of proof sits with the controller. According to the AEPD, a controller that decides no assessment is needed cannot simply say so in the conclusions of its risk analysis. Under the accountability principle in Article 5(2) of the GDPR, "the controller must be able not only to demonstrate that the impact assessment is not necessary, but also to provide all the necessary explanations and supporting documentation that prove it." The decision not to carry one out, the note adds, must be "sufficiently justified both documentarily and materially."

Montezuma's post condensed the same point into a sentence: "A prior risk assessment does not relieve a controller of the obligation to conduct a DPIA where the Article 35 conditions are met."

How the census worked

FC Barcelona's board approved a census update for the 2022/23 season on June 21, 2022, according to the resolution. The club had not run one since 2012. Its stated aims were to clean up the register, catch membership cards still being used after a member's death and curb the resale of season tickets in a stadium with more demand than seats. The previous census, in 2012, used online forms for members outside Barcelona and office visits for the rest, and recovered 1,000 season tickets.

According to the resolution, the club's published process for the digital route had eight steps:

  1. Members logged in through the club website or members' app with their password and personal PIN and opened "New census of members".
  2. They went to the section for new census procedures.
  3. They selected their country and the type of official identity document.
  4. They showed the identity document to the camera, which scanned it automatically.
  5. They took a selfie.
  6. They recorded their voice for five seconds.
  7. They opened a form with their personal data, completed it and verified their "Barça profile".
  8. The process ended with a certificate confirming it had been completed.

Behind those screens sat a chain of three companies. The club contracted Indra Soluciones Tecnologías de la Información as its data processor on October 24, 2022. Indra subcontracted Sistemas Informáticos Abiertos (SIA) on November 14, 2022, and SIA held a licence for facial comparison and voice authentication software from Veridas Digital Authentication Solutions dating from March 4, 2021. According to the resolution, the Veridas engine generated one facial vector from the identity document photo and another from the selfie, compared them against a threshold and, on a match, deleted the document photo. The vectors stayed encrypted on SIA's servers for seven days. A failed match sent the member to the club's offices.

The voice system was separate. It was optional, excluded minors and was meant for later telephone procedures such as buying tickets or releasing a seat. The vector was stored in the member's record in the club's management software, alongside the phone number and identity document number. According to the resolution, the club said on July 17, 2024 that it had never switched voice authentication on, and it later told the AEPD that all voice records had been deleted.

The stakes for members were real. Article 11.8 of the club's statutes obliges members to "carry out the procedures for updating the electoral census promoted by the Club, either by requiring the member's presence or by providing the required data". The statutes also allow the club to remove members "who, after two reliable requests and three months after the second, have not completed the census update procedures required". The first mailing to members, sent on March 20, 2023, did not mention that the update could be done in person, according to the resolution's proven facts. The option was mentioned later, including in the FAQ pages on the club's website.

Census figure Number
Members covered by the census about 143,000
Members who completed the update 124,872
Completed online with facial comparison 112,623
Online members who consented to voice recording 72,648
Completed in person 12,249
In-person members who consented to voice recording 160
Members who did not update and lost membership 14,433
Members under 18 14,511
Cards of deceased members detected 993

Source: figures the club gave the AEPD on September 4, 2025, as recorded in the resolution.

Why the club's documents failed

The club did not skip compliance work, and the AEPD's note says as much. It recorded a risk assessment, a proportionality analysis, involvement of its data protection officer, a review of supplier documentation and an entry in its record of processing. The trouble lay in the order and the content.

The data protection officer's conclusions, dated November 9, 2022, stated that "the processing is not included in Articles 35.1 and 2 GDPR" and that, "although biometric data are processed, they cannot be classified as a special category". Two risk reports followed: one for the facial system, dated November 20, 2022 in some passages of the resolution and November 22, 2022 in others, and one for voice, dated December 22, 2022. Both found inherent risk low and residual risk minimal. The club later argued they were, in substance, impact assessments.

The AEPD rejected that argument on chronology alone. The services contract was signed on October 24, 2022 and the data processing contract on November 17, 2022, before either report. "Signing the services contract and the data processing contract before carrying out the risk analyses de facto invalidates any subsequent conclusion on the conformity of the processing with the GDPR," the resolution states. The reports "seem rather a mere formal backing for a decision already taken."

The content fared no better. The resolution describes a data life cycle "so generic that it could serve for any processing operation", nearly identical across the two systems. A risk of unintentional modification of data was scored at likelihood 1 ("Negligible") and impact 2 ("Limited") with no explanation of where the numbers came from. The reports referred to 19 types of risk but did not examine all of them. They did not record any consultation of members, defined no action or follow-up plan and did not state the position of the person who signed them.

The club had also described the facial system as one that "cannot be deceived". The AEPD's answer was blunt: "by definition, nothing is completely secure (all the more so with the use of a probabilistic system)". It noted that the reports did not consider a manipulated identity document carrying the photo of the person taking the selfie rather than the real holder. The club's own documents conceded that biometric processing "could be classified within the definition of technologies considered immature", while insisting that the Veridas software was "completely secure" because of its certifications.

The conclusion is stated in one line: "for a DPIA to be valid and comply with the GDPR, it is not enough that it be carried out formally; it must be carried out materially and passed."

Four criteria, without Article 9

The AEPD measured the census against its own list of processing operations that require an impact assessment, drawn up under Article 35(4) of the GDPR and approved by the EDPB. That list, as quoted in the resolution, states: "When analysing data processing, it will be necessary to carry out a DPIA in most cases in which the processing meets two or more criteria of the list set out below". According to the AEPD, the census met at least four even with biometric identification set aside.

AEPD list criterion (wording as quoted in the resolution) AEPD finding
"2. Processing that involves automated decision-making or that contributes to a large extent to such decisions, including any type of decision that prevents a data subject from exercising a right or from accessing a good or a service or from entering into a contract." The facial match produced a positive or negative result with no human involved, and a negative result could leave a member's record un-updated and, ultimately, cost membership.
"7. Processing that involves the large-scale use of data." The census covered all 143,000 members across several countries, including the full contents of identity documents.
"9. Processing of data of vulnerable subjects or those at risk of social exclusion, including data of minors under 14 years of age..." Members under 14 went through the process via parents or guardians, which the AEPD said still counts.
"10. Processing involving the use of new technologies or an innovative use of consolidated technologies..." The technology was new to the club, combined two biometric systems and was described by the club itself as possibly immature.

The criterion on biometric identification, item 5 on the same list, was also contested. The club argued it only authenticated members, one-to-one, rather than identifying them. The AEPD replied that the comparison ran against the photo on a national identity document and that the voice vector sat next to other personal data in the member file, so "the processing operations were indeed carried out to uniquely identify a person with biometric data, even if through authentication and not identification."

On automated decision-making, the club pointed to the fact that a failed match could be reviewed in person. The AEPD cited the Court of Justice ruling of December 7, 2023 in case C-634/21 on the breadth of the concept of "decision" and held that later human review "does not invalidate the earlier automated individual decision as such." It added that a failed match was not flagged to the club automatically: the member had to contact the club to start a review.

On scale, the club had compared its membership with the population of Catalonia, of Spain and of the world. The AEPD dismissed the exercise. The 143,000 members, it said, are "by no means a negligible number of people". The club's own breakdown at June 30, 2022 put 54,337 members in Barcelona city, 24,379 in the metropolitan area, 49,527 in the rest of Catalonia, 7,143 elsewhere in Spain and 7,700 abroad.

The Article 9 charge that fell away

The case began with a heavier accusation. When the AEPD opened proceedings on December 23, 2024, it charged the club with processing special category data without a valid exception under Article 9 of the GDPR, alongside the Article 35 charge. That charge was dropped.

The reason was a change of doctrine. When the club designed the census in 2022, the AEPD's own May 2021 guide on employment relations followed an older reading from the Article 29 Working Party, under which biometric data counted as special category data only when processed to uniquely identify a person. The EDPB set out a different position in its Guidelines 05/2022 on facial recognition, in the version adopted on April 26, 2023, about five weeks after the census opened. The AEPD adopted that position on November 23, 2023, in its guide on biometric attendance control. The census closed on November 30, 2023. The AEPD therefore accepted the club's arguments on culpability.

The note is precise about the limits of that concession. The earlier criterion can excuse an organisation from the infringement of lacking an Article 9(2) exception "for the period in which that earlier criterion was in force. But not from the liability that may arise from having breached the rest of its obligations, such as carrying out and passing an impact assessment, since special category status is not the only criterion that determines that processing may entail a high risk."

From €6 million to €500,000

The initial figures were steep. According to the resolution, the December 2024 initiation agreement proposed €4 million for the Article 9 charge and €2 million for Article 35. The instructor's proposed resolution of November 4, 2025 dropped Article 9 and set the Article 35 fine at €500,000, the figure in the final resolution signed by AEPD president Lorenzo Cotino Hueso.

Stage Date Article 9 Article 35 Total
Initiation agreement December 23, 2024 €4,000,000 €2,000,000 €6,000,000
Proposed resolution November 4, 2025 Closed €500,000 €500,000
Final resolution Not printed on the resolution Closed €500,000 €500,000
Legal range for Article 35 - - €0 to €14,866,260 -

The ceiling comes from Article 83(4)(a) of the GDPR: up to €10 million or 2% of total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. The AEPD set it at €14,866,260 using the 2023/2024 net turnover of the club and its subsidiaries. The final fine is about 3.4% of that ceiling and one twelfth of the original proposal, both PPC Land calculations.

The club fought the amount. It described itself as a non-profit sports association, cited accumulated losses and debts of €2,326,958,000 at June 30, 2023 and €2,417,609,000 at June 30, 2024, warned that members would bear the cost through their fees and pointed to an earlier AEPD case against a large retailer in which, according to the club, the Article 35 fine was €50,000. The AEPD treated the club as an undertaking under Article 4(18) of the GDPR and noted that, in the 2023/24 annual report, €390 million of net turnover came from commercial operations and advertising and €215 million from television rights, against €65 million from members and season ticket holders.

The grading weighed negligence rather than intent. The AEPD gave "special importance" to the club's privacy staff, external law firm and a data protection officer "with more than 20 years of experience", who "should have known" that an assessment was required. It also treated the full contents of the national identity document as particularly sensitive data under recitals 51 and 75 of the GDPR. The resolution does not set out arithmetic for the move from €2 million to €500,000 on Article 35. The passage immediately before the figure notes that the voice system's second phase, its use in telephone services, never went live, and that the voice records were deleted.

The club's attempt to invoke the EU AI Act also failed. It had argued that the regulation's annex supported treating biometric authentication as low risk. The AEPD said the Act did not apply: it entered into force on August 1, 2024, after the census ended, and it had not been established that the Veridas tools used artificial intelligence. "This technique of cherry-picking rules cannot be taken into account in upholding its submissions," the resolution states.

Reactions under the post

One of the two comments under Montezuma's post came from Darío López Rincón, who lists a 2024 AEPD research prize among his credentials. He wrote in Spanish that the closure of the Article 9 charge was "no less important", because the club acted under the criterion in force before the EDPB's change or clarification. "Not bad, the half a kilo, without having counted what was closed," he added, using Spanish slang for half a million euros.

Why it matters for marketers

The census shows how biometric checks tend to arrive: as a vendor feature added to an ordinary customer process, in this case membership renewal. The AEPD's note addresses the moment such tools are procured: the decision whether an impact assessment is needed, and the paperwork that supports it.

Three parts of the reasoning travel. The assessment has to come before the processor contract is signed, not after. A vendor's certifications do not remove the controller's duty to assess risk. And the combination of features familiar from marketing operations, large audiences, automated pass or fail decisions, linking a new data point to an existing customer record and a technology new to the organisation, can trigger the duty without any special category data in play. The AEPD's analysis rests on features of the processing, not on the club's sector. FC Barcelona's revenue mix, with more from commercial operations and advertising than from its members, was cited only to show that it operates as a business.

The note also lands in a busy year for Spanish enforcement on biometrics. PPC Land reported the FC Barcelona fine on March 4, 2026, and six days later reported that the AEPD had fined Yoti €950,000 over biometric data and consent failures. Yoti later pulled its Digital ID app from Spanish app stores from September 10. In February, the agency warned World's iris-scan operator over GDPR risks ahead of a planned relaunch in Barcelona, with impact assessment gaps among its concerns. Before that, it sanctioned airport operator Aena over facial recognition at boarding gates.

The EDPB, for its part, adopted its first standardised DPIA template in March 2026. That template sets a minimum of what must be recorded and leaves the methodology to controllers, which is precisely where the AEPD found the club's documents wanting. Outside Spain, Norway's Datatilsynet forced SATS to let gym members object to check-in photos in a July 2026 decision on a similar everyday use of faces at the door.

What remains open

Several points remain unanswered by the documents. The resolution does not print the date on which it was signed, and none of the material says whether the club appealed; the resolution allowed one month for an administrative appeal to the AEPD president or two months to go to the Audiencia Nacional. The figures the club gave account for about 139,300 of the roughly 143,000 members, and the resolution does not explain the gap. It also does not say how many minors used the online route.

Key facts

  • Authority: Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Presidency; resolution signed by president Lorenzo Cotino Hueso
  • Procedure: PS/00450/2024 (file EXP202305134; preliminary investigation AI/00231/2023)
  • Controller: Fútbol Club Barcelona (NIF G08266298)
  • Infringement: Article 35 GDPR (data protection impact assessment), classified under Article 83(4)(a) GDPR; serious for limitation purposes under Article 73(t) of Spain's Organic Law 3/2018 (LOPDGDD)
  • Fine: €500,000; Article 9 GDPR charge closed (archivo)
  • Initial proposal: €6,000,000 (€4,000,000 Article 9, €2,000,000 Article 35), initiation agreement of December 23, 2024
  • Systems: SBRF (facial biometric recognition system, 1:1 comparison of identity document photo and selfie); SBRVoz (voice biometric recognition system)
  • Processor chain: Indra Soluciones Tecnologías de la Información S.L.U. (processor, contract of October 24, 2022; data processing annex of November 17, 2022); Sistemas Informáticos Abiertos, S.A. (sub-processor, November 14, 2022); Veridas Digital Authentication Solutions S.L. (software, licence to SIA of March 4, 2021)
  • Census period: March 20 to November 30, 2023
  • Appeal routes stated in the resolution: recurso de reposición to the AEPD president within one month, or contentious-administrative appeal to the Audiencia Nacional within two months
  • AEPD note: "Necesidad de evaluación de impacto en los sistemas biométricos de autenticación", Criterios jurídicos section, dated November 17, 2026, https://www.aepd.es/informes-y-resoluciones/criterios-juridicos-aepd/eipd-biometria-autenticacion
  • Resolution length: 139 pages, in Spanish
  • Unofficial English translation: 21 pages, covering original pages 100 to 127 (legal grounds IV to VII); translator not named
  • LinkedIn post: Luis Alberto Montezuma, November 18, 2026

Timeline

  • 2012 - FC Barcelona's previous census update, using online forms and office visits, recovers 1,000 season tickets.
  • June 21, 2022 - The club's board approves a census update for the 2022/23 season.
  • September 22, 2022 - The club asks its data protection officer for a prior analysis of biometrics in the census.
  • October 24, 2022 - Services contract signed with Indra.
  • November 9, 2022 - Data protection officer's conclusions state no impact assessment is needed.
  • November 14, 2022 - Indra subcontracts SIA, which licenses Veridas software.
  • November 17, 2022 - Data processing contract with Indra signed.
  • November 20 or 22, 2022 - Risk report on the facial system (the resolution gives both dates).
  • December 22, 2022 - Risk report on the voice system.
  • March 20, 2023 - Census campaign opens; first mailing does not mention the in-person option.
  • April 5 to May 4, 2023 - The club suspends the digital process and resumes it with the same conclusions.
  • April 21, 2023 - First member complaint reaches the AEPD and is forwarded to the club.
  • April 26, 2023 - EDPB adopts the version of Guidelines 05/2022 on facial recognition cited in the resolution.
  • November 23, 2023 - AEPD adopts the EDPB position on biometrics in its guide on attendance control.
  • November 30, 2023 - Census closes after two extensions.
  • December 3, 2023 and February 1, 2024 - Second and third complaints.
  • July 17, 2024 - The club tells the AEPD voice authentication was never switched on.
  • August 1, 2024 - EU AI Act enters into force.
  • December 23, 2024 - AEPD opens sanctioning proceedings, proposing €6 million in total.
  • January 24, 2025 - Club's submissions; it says all voice records were deleted.
  • November 4, 2025 - Proposed resolution: €500,000 under Article 35, Article 9 charge closed.
  • November 21, 2025 - Club's submissions against the proposal.
  • November 30, 2025 - AEPD sanction against Aena over airport facial recognition reported.
  • February 17, 2026 - AEPD warning to Tools for Humanity over iris scanning reported.
  • March 4, 2026 - PPC Land reports the €500,000 fine against FC Barcelona.
  • March 10, 2026 - AEPD fine of €950,000 against Yoti reported.
  • April 25, 2026 - EDPB's first DPIA template reported.
  • August 14, 2026 - Norway's decision on SATS gym check-in photos reported.
  • September 3, 2026 - Yoti's withdrawal of its Digital ID app in Spain reported.
  • November 17, 2026 - AEPD publishes its legal criterion on impact assessments for biometric authentication.
  • November 18, 2026 - Luis Alberto Montezuma posts on LinkedIn with an unofficial English translation of the impact assessment section.

Summary

Who: Spain's data protection authority, the AEPD, and FC Barcelona, the controller fined in sanctioning procedure PS/00450/2024, with processors Indra, SIA and Veridas. Luis Alberto Montezuma shared the decision on LinkedIn.

What: The AEPD published a legal criterion stating that a risk analysis cannot automatically replace a data protection impact assessment and that a decision not to carry one out must be documented and justified. It draws on the €500,000 fine imposed on the club for running facial and voice biometric checks on about 143,000 members without a valid assessment, after an Article 9 charge was dropped.

When: The AEPD note is dated November 17, 2026. Montezuma's post appeared on November 18, 2026. The census ran from March 20 to November 30, 2023, and PPC Land reported the fine on March 4, 2026.

Where: Spain, under the EU's GDPR, with the census run online for members in Barcelona, the rest of Spain and abroad.

Why: The AEPD found that the census met at least four high-risk criteria on its own list, that the club's risk reports post-dated its processor contracts and lacked substance, and that the change in how biometric data is classified did not excuse the missing impact assessment.