On November 18, 2026, a coalition of 39 states and the District of Columbia asked the federal bankruptcy court in Delaware to deny the sale of a technology license from Character Technologies, the company behind Character.ai, to Disney Worldwide Services, arguing that the core of the deal was finished before the company filed for Chapter 11 and that nobody has ever valued what Disney is buying. The 32-page objection, Docket No. 194 in case 26-11603 (BLS), was filed by the National Association of Attorneys General for most of the states, with separate signature blocks for Colorado, Florida, New Jersey, Oregon and Pennsylvania. Texas filed a 15-page objection of its own the same day, Docket No. 195, and joined the coalition's. Both landed on the deadline for objections to the sale, 15 days before the sale hearing scheduled for December 3.

In Short

Forty states and the District of Columbia have now objected to Character.ai's plan to sell Disney a license to its technology, after Disney hired 66 of the company's 86 employees, including its chief executive, in September. The states say the bankrupt company gets $20 million while the people who moved get about $180 million in pay and retention over three years, that no one has put a value on the license or on the legal releases Disney secured, and that Disney does not qualify as a good-faith buyer. They also want a full accounting of whether users' chats, including those of minors, sit inside the AI training and safety tools Disney would license, since Character.ai told users it does "not sell personal information for monetary consideration." Judge Brendan L. Shannon will hear the arguments at the sale hearing on December 3 and 4, where the deal can be approved as drafted, narrowed or refused.

Two objections, one deadline

The coalition's filing is titled "The Coalition of States Objection to the Debtor's and Disney Worldwide Services, Inc.'s Initial Transaction and Proposed Sale." It is dated November 18, 2026, and signed by Abigail Rushing Ryan, bankruptcy counsel at the National Association of Attorneys General, for the "NAAG Client States." Two exhibits travel with it. Exhibit A, 128 pages, is the certified transcript of the October 30 hearing at which Judge Shannon said he would approve the bidding procedures; Reliable's transcriptionists signed it on November 3. Exhibit B, seven pages, is a chart of state privacy laws.

It opens bluntly. "The Debtor asks this Court to approve a sale whose core was completed before this case was filed," the overview states. "What remains is the final step: a $20 million stalking-horse bid for a non-exclusive license and the Purchased Employee Claims, paired with an order that would lock in everything that came before and, potentially, transfer the private conversations of Character.AI's users, including minors."

The overview promises four reasons: price, a contract signed after the petition, Disney's good faith and user privacy. The body adds a fifth section, on consumer protection law and the safety record of the technology Disney would license.

Texas's filing comes from the Bankruptcy and Collections Division of the Office of the Attorney General of Texas, under Attorney General Ken Paxton, and is signed by Assistant Attorney General Stephanie Eberhardt, with Sahrish K. Soleja and Layla D. Milligan also listed. "The Sale Motion seeks the Court's blessing for a transaction that was largely complete before this case was even filed," it begins. Texas is narrower in what it wants. "The State of Texas does not ask the Court to stop the auction or to deny a value-maximizing sale," the filing says; it wants the proposed order cut back to "what section 363 actually authorizes." Then, in a single sentence: "The State of Texas also joins in the Objection filed by the Coalition of States."

Request Coalition of states (Docket No. 194) Texas (Docket No. 195)
The sale Deny it, or condition any sale on the points raised Decline the proposed order unless it is modified
Amended and Restated TSA Decline to approve its assumption Not addressed as a separate request
Retroactive approval of prior acts Strike Not addressed as a separate request
"Reasonably equivalent value" finding Strike Not addressed as a separate request
Exculpation of Disney (paragraph 16) Strike; if kept, carve out police and regulatory actions Strike, or limit it to the debtor's own claims
Injunctions (paragraphs 10 and 15) Not addressed as a separate request Limit to the licensed IP and the Purchased Employee Claims; carve out claims based on Disney's and the hired employees' own conduct and government enforcement
Good-faith finding under section 363(m) Deny Withhold until the debtor produces four kinds of evidence
Releases The court should be able to review the September releases and their consideration Exclude claims against the former CEO and other insiders and keep them for the estate
Clause barring meetings with regulators without Disney's consent Not addressed Decline to approve it or any finding ratifying it
Users' personal data Bar any transfer absent compliance with state privacy law; account for user data inside the licensed technology Exclude data of Texas residents who are known minors and sensitive data of any Texas consumer, absent the consent Texas law requires
Valuation The debtor cannot carry its burden Require valuation evidence at the sale hearing

$20 million for the estate, $180 million for the staff

The coalition's first argument is about price, and it rests on figures already in the court record. In September 2026, according to the objection, Disney hired 66 of Character.ai's 86 employees, 76.7% of the workforce by PPC Land's calculation, including the chief executive. According to the states, "Disney estimates the talent it hired from Character.AI at approximately $60 million per year in compensation, for an approximate total of $180 million, plus a $30 million retention pool." That money, the transaction documents say, "will not constitute consideration payable to the Company." The estate's share is the $20 million in Disney's stalking horse bid.

When the states' counsel put the $180 million figure to Colin M. Adams, Character.ai's chief executive, at the October 30 hearing, he did not adopt it. "I think that you're getting that number from a piece of the termsheet where Disney inserted that as their estimate of what it's going to cost to pay and retain the people that have gone to Disney, so that's a number that Disney has put into a termsheet," he testified. "I will take it at face value that that's their estimate of what these -- what this talent is going to cost them."

No valuation exists, the states say. Asked under oath at the same hearing whether the non-exclusive license had been valued, Adams answered: "No." The company's own schedules, filed as Docket No. 142, list its intellectual property as "Undetermined," with the valuation method given as "None," and put its licenses at $0, according to the objection.

The $20 million cannot stand in for a valuation either, the coalition argues, because it has never been split between the license, the Purchased Employee Claims, the releases and the transition services agreement. Adams described the package differently at the hearing: "what Disney is purchasing is they purchased talent, and they also are purchasing a license that goes along with that talent, a non-exclusive license. So that's one --that's one whole integrated piece that goes together." The exclusivity and prepayment agreement Disney signed in September describes the $20 million as consideration "for entering into this [EPA] and the TSA and consummating the Proposed Transaction," the states note.

Texas adds the cash already paid. Disney, according to its filing, "paid $5.5 million on a non-refundable basis and a $2.0 million refundable deposit."

The closest benchmark, in the coalition's view, is Google. In August 2024, according to both objections, Google paid approximately $2.7 billion in a transaction that included a perpetual, nonexclusive license to Character.ai's technology, existing models and weights among it, and broad releases for the employees it recruited. "Although the licensed assets differ, the substantial disparity in consideration raises serious questions," the states write. By PPC Land's calculation, Google's figure is 135 times Disney's.

Figure Amount Source in the filings
Disney's stalking horse price for the license and Purchased Employee Claims $20 million Coalition and Texas objections
Disney's estimate of pay for the hired staff About $60 million a year, about $180 million in total Coalition objection, citing the binding term sheet
Retention pool $30 million Coalition objection
Non-refundable payment already made by Disney $5.5 million Texas objection
Refundable deposit $2.0 million Texas objection
Break-up fee $700,000 (3.5%) Coalition objection, paragraph 73
Minimum overbid for a rival $21.7 million Coalition objection
Rival bid above which the estate would be better off About $15.2 million Coalition objection
Value of the IP in the company's schedules "Undetermined"; licenses at $0 Coalition objection, citing Docket No. 142
Google transaction, August 2024 About $2.7 billion Coalition and Texas objections
Employees hired by Disney 66 of 86 Coalition and Texas objections
Hired employees Disney can keep from a rival 20%, which the states put at 13 Coalition objection
Parties approached before the filing 28, producing one proposal Coalition and Texas objections

A market test that cannot reach what Disney bought

Could an auction settle the question? The states say not this one. A rival cannot bid on what Disney is buying: anyone who wants to compete must bid for an exclusive license or for the whole company, and additional stalking horses are barred from including any of Disney's assets in their bids. That, the states argue, conflicts with the sworn declaration of Adam Dunayer, the Houlihan Lokey managing director running the sale, who wrote that the procedures give the company "flexibility in the Sale Process to ensure that all of its Assets are market-tested and sold for the highest or otherwise best price."

On the witness stand on October 30, Dunayer gave a different picture of the buyers he was hearing from. "Well, I don't think most of the people we're talking to are even looking at what Disney bought and thinking about overbidding Disney in just that asset pool," he said. "And I grant everyone this, this is highly unusual and complicated far beyond what you like to see but there is extenuating circumstances here." He continued: "We are selling a business. Disney is not buying the business."

The same transcript records the case for the structure. Adams called Disney's bid "a significant benefit to this estate" and explained the logic: "We get $20 million from Disney, and then we can sell, effectively, the same asset to somebody else for the price that they will pay, thus, increasing the value of the estate and distributions to creditors." Dunayer reported that Houlihan had contacted "a 170 or so buyers," had about 50 non-disclosure agreements signed and "maybe another 25 in process." His summary: "Interest is high. People are coming out of the woodwork." He added a caution of his own: "I tell people there is a big gap between interest and a signed purchase agreement."

The objection pulls in outside research to explain why, in an acqui-hire, the staff rather than the code carry the value. Quoting a 2025 S&P Global research note titled "It's Not What You Acquire, It's Who You Acquire," the states say Character.ai's "core value, recognized in Google's acqui-hire, was concentrated on technical expertise rather than commercial or support functions."

Then come the terms the states say tilt the field:

  • Employee holdback. A winning rival may try to hire up to 80% of the 66 employees, but Disney chooses the 20%, which the states put at 13, that rivals cannot approach. "One would assume the twenty percent would include the six key employees ear-marked by Disney, including the former CEO, which would deter other bidders," the objection says. Asked at the hearing whether Disney gets to decide who the 20% will be, Dunayer answered: "Correct."
  • Sole approval. The September term sheet required bidding procedures "satisfactory to Disney, in its sole discretion."
  • The floor. A rival must offer at least $21.7 million, even though, according to the states, any bid above roughly $15.2 million would leave the estate better off, because the estate keeps the $5.5 million whatever happens. The $30 million retention pool "may deter other bidders," they add.
  • The marketing. Before the filing, 28 parties were offered an investment in, or a purchase of, the whole company, producing "one non-actionable proposal." Asked whether the company had ever marketed a deal like Disney's, Adams said: "I do not know." Houlihan was formally engaged on September 23, Dunayer testified, after the agreements with Disney were signed, and the states say the earlier banker is unidentified. Section 1(a) of the exclusivity agreement required the company to "immediately cease and cause to be terminated all existing discussions... with all other third parties."

Two passages in the objection do not match the transcript attached to it. Paragraph 24 calls Disney's protection a "$3.5 million breakup fee" that is "a little bit rich," citing the transcript. The words were Judge Shannon's, and he was speaking of a percentage: "I would observe that 3.5 percent is, at least, in my experience, probably a little bit rich but there is no shortage of cases and transactions that have involved different amounts. So, I am prepared to approve them." The objection's own paragraph 73 puts the fee at $700,000. Paragraph 11 also attributes to the chief executive the view that what Disney obtained before the filing "cannot be market tested through this process." In the transcript, those words come from Linda J. Casey, the US Trustee's lawyer, during argument, and the objection's footnote 110 labels the same lines "UST Argument."

Judge Shannon said on October 30 that he was prepared to approve the procedures and Disney's bid protections, and the order approving them is on the docket as No. 106. The coalition is now arguing that the auction those procedures produce, set for December 1, "cannot prove value."

A contract dated the day after the petition

The second argument concerns paperwork. The original transition services agreement and the exclusivity and prepayment agreement were signed separately on September 18, 2026. Character Technologies filed for Chapter 11 on October 12. On October 13, according to the states, Adams signed an Amended and Restated Transition Services Agreement that, for the first time, incorporated the exclusivity agreement and attached it as an exhibit.

The new agreement provides that it "shall supersede and replace the Original Agreement in its entirety," according to the objection. That makes it a postpetition contract, the states argue, and only executory contracts that existed on the petition date can be assumed under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. Anything signed afterwards falls under section 363(b) and needs notice, a hearing and a full record.

The amended agreement also added a Schedule D, which "shall govern the Processing of Personal Data." The states point to two features. Although Schedule D is meant to keep the company's personal information separate from Disney's systems, it allows Disney to "receive, host, copy, retain, or maintain Personal Data outside of [the Debtor's] Systems" when agreed in writing. And it "shall not apply where both [the Debtor and Disney] agree that they act as independent controllers with regard to applicable Personal Data."

Why does the incorporation matter? Because, the states argue, Disney's services are the price of the releases. Section 2.1(j) of the amended agreement says Disney "is agreeing to perform . . .the Services in order to facilitate the release of Released Matters. . .set forth in Section 4 (Release and Waiver) of the Exclusivity Agreement." The releases, according to the objection, include:

  • a general release of Disney and all "Hired Employees," the former chief executive among them;
  • release of claims about the company's "wind-up, liquidation. . .or the sale or license of the Company's assets," including use of its IP and know-how;
  • a waiver of California Civil Code section 1542, which would otherwise keep unknown claims out of a general release;
  • a covenant not to sue that runs "following the Closing"; and
  • a clause binding the company's "successors and assigns."

The binding term sheet adds releases for the chief executive and other transferring employees "including, as applicable, fiduciary duty claims." According to the states, the company's position is that the September releases are final and not reviewable. "The Debtor cannot have it both ways," the objection says: either the exclusivity agreement is a finished prepetition contract the court cannot touch, or the company wants the court's blessing, in which case the court should review the releases and what was paid for them. A postpetition agreement to "perform under . . .and implement" the releases, the states argue, is an unauthorized transfer of estate property that can be avoided under section 549(a). Once a court approves assumption of an agreement containing releases, the states add, citing In re Vision Metals, later fraudulent-transfer arguments are barred.

The amended agreement also carries a new, uncapped indemnity. Under section 6.1, the company must defend, indemnify and hold harmless Disney "and its Affiliates, and their respective officers, directors, shareholders, agents, employees, contractors and assigns of each" against "suits, claims, demands, penalties, fines, charges, proceedings, causes of action, damages, losses, liabilities, costs and expenses of any nature. . . arising directly or indirectly from or out of. . .the conduct and operation of the CAI business. . .while Services are provided." The indemnity "shall survive any determination that this Agreement or any portion hereof is void or voidable."

All of this is already in effect. Adams told the court the company had been "under the TSA since the beginning of October," and, according to the states, the former employees now at Disney run "the engineering, trust and safety, and monetization functions for the debtor." The judge probed the arrangement himself on October 30. Adams explained that the company had negotiated access to 20% of the Disney employees' time, "through, I believe, it's the end of February," and described Disney's stake in the app this way: "whether or not the app continues to exist, the platform continues to exist, I don't think that that is of any moment to Disney or impacts their economics."

The states reject the idea that the services are free, since the term sheet grants the releases "in consideration for" them, and argue that moving most of the staff and operations to a buyer, and releasing claims in return, fails both Third Circuit tests for ordinary-course transactions. The proposed order would make assumption effective only if Disney wins the auction, and only at closing. If Disney loses, the states say, the company "will have performed a postpetition contract, indemnity included, without court approval."

What the sale order would lock in

Much of both objections is aimed at the proposed sale order, which the company filed with its sale motion on October 13 as part of Docket No. 15-2.

The coalition singles out three provisions. The order would approve "all acts taken...and all terms, obligations, releases, conditions, waivers" under the stalking horse agreement, the exclusivity agreement and the transition agreement, reaching back before the filing. It would deem the consideration "reasonably equivalent value...under the Bankruptcy Code and any other applicable law," a finding the states say would pre-empt fraudulent-transfer challenges before the investigation by Christopher Sontchi, the independent director who joined the board on October 1, or any investigation by the creditors' committee could be completed. And it would exculpate "(a) [Disney] and its affiliates and successors and (b) their respective officers, directors, managers, employees, shareholders, agents, contractors, professionals, and assigns" from liability "to any person or entity for any claims, suits, demands, penalties, fines, charges, proceedings, causes of action, damages, losses, costs, or expenses of any nature" arising from performance of the transition agreement.

"Disney is not an estate fiduciary and cannot be exculpated," the states write. They argue that the Supreme Court's 2024 decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma, which barred non-consensual third-party releases in plans, should extend to early section 363 sales of most of an estate's assets.

Texas goes further on the injunctions. Paragraph 10 of the proposed order, according to its filing, would permanently bar all persons, expressly including "governmental, tax, and regulatory authorities," from asserting claims against any buyer party "in any way relating to" the company or the transaction, and expressly reaches claims arising from "the Buyer's or its affiliates' employment of certain former Debtor employees." Paragraph 15 would enjoin proceedings concerning "any ... claim in this Chapter 11 Case or in connection with or related to the Transaction or the Debtor." Paragraph 16 would exculpate Disney's "officers, directors, managers, employees" for transition services conduct "before, on, or after the Closing."

"Texas's enforcement of the Texas Data Privacy and Security Act, the Securing Children Online Through Parental Empowerment Act, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act against Disney for Disney's own acts cannot be enjoined through this sale," the filing says. A sale cuts off successor-liability claims only where they "flow from the debtor's ownership of the sold assets," Texas argues, citing the Second Circuit's 2016 Motors Liquidation decision. Here, Texas says, ownership of the IP does not move: the company retains "all right, title and interest in and to its assets, properties, businesses and operations" other than the license. "Because the license is non-exclusive, the Debtor keeps the underlying IP."

"These issues must be resolved now," Texas adds, because releases that form part of the consideration for an unstayed sale may not be severable on appeal under section 363(m).

It closes with proposed wording for the order. The first sentence reads, word for word:

"Nothing in this Sale Order, the Sale Documents, any amendments thereto, or related documents, discharges, releases, precludes, or enjoins: (i) any liability to any governmental unit as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) ("Governmental Unit") that is not a "claim" as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) ("Claim"); (ii) any Claim of a Governmental Unit arising on or after the Confirmation Date; (iii) any liability to a Governmental Unit under police and regulatory statutes or regulations that any entity would be subject to as the owner or operator of property after the Confirmation Date; or (iv) any liability to a Governmental Unit on the part of any Person other than the Debtors."

The rest of the proposed text preserves government licenses and permits, information requests, setoff and recoupment rights, and the jurisdiction of other tribunals. Parts of it refer to a "Confirmation Date," a "Confirmation Order" and "the Plan," terms drawn from plan confirmation rather than from a sale order.

The Abbotts Dairies comparison

The third argument leans on a 1986 Third Circuit decision. In In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania, a buyer struck an interim agreement before the bankruptcy, offered the debtor's chief executive a lucrative salary and a five-year employment offer and required the filing and immediate court approval of the agreements; a higher competing bid, conditioned on unwinding the buyer's head start, was withdrawn. The appeals court reversed because no good-faith finding had been made, holding that the circumstances were "ripe for collusion and interested dealing."

The states map the case onto this one in three steps. Disney and the company signed prepetition contracts that Disney calls "integral" to the sale. Disney offered key employees lucrative contracts, hired them away and obtained releases for them and for itself. And Disney required the company to file for bankruptcy and seek approval of the interim agreements and the final sale. According to the objection, the hired employees, including former chief executive Karandeep Anand, obtained personal benefits from Disney, among them "a three-year employment agreement that is valued at $180 million," as well as the releases.

On October 30, the states' counsel asked Adams whether Anand and other insiders who later joined Disney sat in on the special committee's meetings during the negotiations. "At times, yes; at times, no," Adams said. Sessions could open with management presenting "the open points" and "the closed points," after which the committee, Rick Marini and Stan Chudnovsky, the two independent directors, would "ask the insiders to leave the room."

Texas builds the same argument with different evidence demands. The company's sale motion states that "[t]here are no agreements between Disney and the Debtor's current management," which Texas says "says nothing about the former CEO, who was an insider of the Debtor when Disney hired him." Before any good-faith finding, Texas wants the company to produce evidence of:

  1. the compensation and other benefits the former chief executive received or will receive from Disney;
  2. when his discussions with Disney began;
  3. his role, if any, in the decision to enter into the exclusivity agreement; and
  4. the deliberations of the Initial Transaction Committee.

Texas also calls the package a sub rosa plan: a sale that settles matters normally left to a Chapter 11 plan, without the disclosure, voting and best-interests protections. Its main example is a clause in the binding term sheet under which the company "will not participate in any meeting with any governmental authority regarding the Proposed Transaction without Disney's prior consent, expect [sic] as required by applicable law." That clause, Texas argues, stops the company from meeting the multistate group of 46 states and territories investigating it, "at the very time the Debtor proposes to resolve those regulators' claims in this case." "The governmental-consent covenant compounds the problem," the filing says.

The judge has already been clear about where this fight belongs. On October 30 he said he was "prepared to find, in the form of order, that the bid procedures and the bid protections have been negotiated in good faith and at arm's length," but added: "That does not answer the question or dispose of the question of whether or not parties can make an objection to the overall sale process about whether it's in good faith." On the releases, he said the court was "not being asked to approve today certain releases," and that "if parties wish to object to the scope of the releases in their propriety, I would deal with that at a sale hearing at the appropriate time." The November 18 filings are those objections.

Chats inside the license?

The fourth argument is the one most likely to travel beyond the bankruptcy bar. On paper, Disney's license excludes users' personal information, "any input entered by [any] end user," "any outputs generated for end users by [Character.AI]," and "training data." The states want that exclusion tested in discovery, because the licensed components include training infrastructure, evaluation frameworks and safety tools that, in their view, were likely built on real conversations.

"Users' inputs and the AI model's outputs are often used to both initially train and then fine-tune the model, gently steering it toward good examples of output and away from bad examples," the objection says. Real chats and complaints would likely have been used to build moderation and safety systems, and "real chat histories may be contained in evaluation sets or other databases that have been curated over time to be used in future training and testing."

The states then turn to a definition. The stalking horse agreement provides: "'Outputs' means the text, image, audio, video, data or other materials, generated or output by any use of the Licensed IP, but excluding the Licensed IP itself." On the states' reading, any chatbot output that has become part of a licensed technology is, by that definition, no longer excluded. "Before any sale is approved, the Debtor must account for exactly what user data the licensed technology contains," the overview says.

Then comes the privacy policy. Character.ai's regional privacy disclosures, updated November 5, 2025, told users that while their data may be shared with third parties for targeted advertising, "we do not sell personal information for monetary consideration," according to the objection. The states draw a line that will be familiar to anyone in ad tech: "people may feel comfortable sharing a device advertising identifier for the purpose of placing an advertisement but may feel very differently if that same business were to sell the contents of their chats with a fictional bot posing as a therapist." They add that their investigation "uncovered evidence that the Debtor failed to offer working mechanisms to effectuate certain consumers' rights, including the right to opt out of sales."

California, the company's home state, gets the most detailed treatment, from the opt-in rule for consumers under 16 (Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.120(c)) to limits on "sensitive personal information" such as data on sexuality, race, ethnicity or health, and a "purpose limitation principle." California's definition of "sale" exempts some bankruptcy transfers, the states concede, but not where the buyer "materially alters how it uses or shares the personal information" or does not assume control of all or part of the business. "Disney is not assuming control of Character.AI's business," the objection says.

State privacy rule cited by the coalition States, according to the objection
Comprehensive consumer privacy laws besides California's 24 other states
Affirmative opt-in consent required for any use of sensitive data, including sale 19 states
Sensitive personal information cannot be sold at all Maryland, New Jersey
Consent required to sell personal information of minors aged 13 to 18 Six states
Sensitive personal data of minors aged 13 to 18 cannot be sold at all Maryland, Oregon, Vermont, Connecticut
Minors under 16 (California) Sale only with affirmative opt-in by the minor or a parent

The coalition cites California's case against General Motors (Napa Superior Court, No. 26CV001011), which it calls the largest California Consumer Privacy Act settlement to date: "[b]usinesses that retain consumers' data long after providing consumers with requested services, and later decide to cash in by selling that data to third parties, risk violating" these laws. Its conclusion: "Simply put, personal information is not just another piece of property to be unilaterally monetized, even in bankruptcy."

Texas cites its own statutes. Under the Texas Data Privacy and Security Act, a "sale of personal data" includes any "transferring of personal data for monetary or other valuable consideration by the controller to a third party," and "sensitive data" includes "personal data collected from a known child." Under the Securing Children Online Through Parental Empowerment Act, unless a verified parent provides otherwise, a provider that enters into an agreement with a known minor "may not . . . share, disclose, or sell the known minor's personal identifying information." Section 363(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code independently bars approval of a sale of personally identifiable information if a showing is made that it would violate non-bankruptcy law. Texas wants any order that includes user data to exclude the personal data of Texas residents who are known minors, and the sensitive data of any Texas consumer, absent the required consent.

Texas also discloses the paper trail behind its interest. Its Consumer Protection Division issued civil investigative demand letters to the company dated December 31, 2024, and August 19, 2025, concerning possible violations of both statutes relating to minors' use of Character.ai, and possible violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act over "misleading and false assertions of medical licensure, academic credentials, and patient confidentiality, and other privacy assertions by Character and its chatbots."

Privacy oversight in the case has moved since October 30, when Adams testified that "[a] consumer ombudsman has not been appointed." Judge Shannon ordered an appointment on November 17, and the US Trustee named Lucy L. Thomson as consumer privacy ombudsman on November 18. Neither objection mentions the order or the appointment.

Therapist bots and the laws coming in January

The coalition's last section argues that Disney would be licensing "what amounts to all of the technology to recreate the Character.AI experience without any protections designed to avoid a recurrence of the exact same harms caused by the Character.AI experience," free and clear of liability, from a company that "has settled multiple lawsuits over the harm caused by their technology."

Seven states, according to the objection, have passed laws regulating or prohibiting chatbots from offering therapy; Colorado's are cited as an example, one of them effective January 1, 2027. The states say Character.ai still hosts bots that purport to offer therapy and other professional services, and cite a character page titled "Female therapist - You're safe now. I'll help you," visited on November 17, 2026.

California's law on the companion chatbot requires operators to maintain "a protocol for preventing the production of suicidal ideation, suicide, or self-harm content to the user," and New York imposes a similar obligation. California's SB 1119 will add duties to protect child users, and further chatbot laws in Connecticut, Colorado and New York take effect, according to the states, "with the turn of the year."

Any purchaser of the technology, "or anyone offering a character-based chatbot service," must agree to three measures, the states say:

  1. "robust age assurance to protect minors from accessing addictive and unhealthy features, adult content, and other potential age-related risks";
  2. "appropriate safety protocols to prevent prohibited content, including the generation and distribution of child sexual abuse materials and child-related obscenity"; and
  3. "adequate testing and monitoring of the platform, chatbots, and user controls put in place to mitigate harm."

These are a shorter version of the nine conditions the states attached to any sale in their notice of interest on October 14.

Who signed

The coalition's membership has shifted since October. The opening paragraph of the November 18 objection names 38 states and the District of Columbia: 35 states and DC through NAAG, plus New Jersey, Oregon and Pennsylvania through their own counsel. Florida does not appear in that paragraph but signs a separate block, by Mandy L. Mills of its Consumer Protection Division. Counting Florida, the filing carries 39 states and DC.

Three details stand out. Maryland, which was not part of the 39-state coalition behind the October 14 notice, now appears. Arkansas and Indiana, which were part of the October coalition, do not appear anywhere in the filing. Maryland and Massachusetts are named in the opening paragraph but are missing from NAAG's signature list. With Texas, 40 states and DC have now objected to the sale.

Why the marketing community is watching

For advertisers and publishers, the case has turned into a working example of what happens to an ad-supported consumer app's data when the business fails. Character.ai earned about $2.5 million a month from advertising while losing about $8 million a month, figures from the chief executive's first-day declaration. The monetization function itself, according to the November 18 objection, is now run by employees who work for Disney under the transition agreement.

Character.ai's disclosures drew a line between sharing data with third parties for targeted advertising and selling personal information for money. The states now argue that this line limits what a bankrupt company can sell, and that section 363 does not displace state privacy law. Their contrast between an advertising identifier and the contents of a chat with a therapist bot is the clearest statement yet, in this case, of where they think that line falls.

The deal structure matters too. The states place the Disney transaction in a run of license-plus-hire deals in AI, with Google's 2024 transaction as the reference point, and PPC Land reported in October that Disney paid $20m for Character.ai's IP and $180m for its staff. The states are now asking a bankruptcy court to put separate values on the pieces of such a deal: the hires, the license and the releases.

The November 18 filings concern the Disney license only. The app, its models and the user data are covered by a separate bid: on November 14, the company named Smirks and Pangs Acquisition LLC as stalking horse at $10 million, and the signed agreement with that buyer depends on moving chats without further consent. Objections to that designation were due at 9 p.m. ET on November 18. Neither of the two objections mentions Smirks and Pangs.

How the sale will be tested from here

Both objections set out the same legal test. According to the coalition, citing In re Whitehall Manor (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2026), a sale outside the ordinary course under section 363(b)(1) in the Third Circuit requires the company to show four things, and the burden is on the company:

  1. Adequate consideration, meaning a fair and reasonable price, with evidence of the value of each asset sold, including releases.
  2. Sound business purpose.
  3. Reasonable notice.
  4. Good faith, with an explicit finding on the purchaser's good faith before section 363(m) protection is granted.

Texas adds that the showing is heightened for an early sale of substantially all of a debtor's assets and for transactions involving insiders. The remaining calendar, set by the bidding procedures order and the November notices, runs as follows:

Date Step
November 18, 4 p.m. ET Deadline for sale and contract objections (Docket Nos. 194 and 195 filed)
November 18, 9 p.m. ET Deadline for objections to the Smirks and Pangs designation
November 24, noon ET Bid deadline
November 25 Company names qualifying bids and the opening bid
November 26 Latest date for the ombudsman's sealed report if the sale hearing opens December 3 (PPC Land calculation)
November 30, 4 p.m. ET Company's reply to sale objections
December 1, 10 a.m. ET Auction
December 3 and 4, 9:30 a.m. ET Sale hearing

What the filings leave open

Neither objection offers a value of its own for the license or the releases, and neither says what Disney would accept if its releases were narrowed. The coalition does not say which employees are the six it calls key, and its privacy-law counts are set out by state only in the seven-page chart filed as Exhibit B. Whether any user conversations actually sit in Character.ai's evaluation sets or safety tools is, by the states' own account, a question for discovery. The company's reply to the objections is due November 30.

Key facts

  • Coalition filing: "The Coalition of States Objection to the Debtor's and Disney Worldwide Services, Inc.'s Initial Transaction and Proposed Sale," Docket No. 194, 32 pages, dated and filed November 18, 2026
  • Coalition exhibits: Exhibit A, transcript of the October 30, 2026 bidding procedures hearing (Docket No. 194-1, 128 pages, certified November 3, 2026); Exhibit B, chart of state laws (Docket No. 194-2, 7 pages)
  • Coalition counsel: Abigail Rushing Ryan, Bankruptcy Counsel, National Association of Attorneys General, for the NAAG Client States; separate blocks for Colorado (Robert Padjen), Florida (Mandy L. Mills), New Jersey (Thomas Huynh), Oregon (Justin D. Leonard) and Pennsylvania (Melissa L. Van Eck)
  • Texas filing: "The State of Texas's Objection to the Debtor's Motion Pursuant to Sections 105, 363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code for Entry of an Order (A) Authorizing and Approving the Sale of Assets, (B) Approving the Assumption of the TSA and the Assumption and Assignment of the Assumed Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, and (C) Granting Related Relief and Joinder to the Coalition of States' Objection to Sale," Docket No. 195, 15 pages, filed November 18, 2026 (re: Docket Nos. 15 and 194)
  • Texas counsel: Stephanie Eberhardt, Sahrish K. Soleja and Layla D. Milligan, Bankruptcy and Collections Division, Office of the Attorney General of Texas
  • Case: In re Character Technologies, Inc., Case No. 26-11603 (BLS), US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Judge Brendan L. Shannon
  • Motion objected to: sale motion, Docket No. 15, filed October 13, 2026; proposed sale order at Docket No. 15-2
  • Buyer: Disney Worldwide Services, Inc., stalking horse for a non-exclusive license and the Purchased Employee Claims at $20 million; break-up fee $700,000 (3.5%)
  • Agreements: Exclusivity and Prepayment Agreement and original Transition Services Agreement, signed September 18, 2026; Amended and Restated Transition Services Agreement, signed October 13, 2026, one day after the October 12 petition
  • Proposed order provisions challenged: retroactive approval of "all acts taken"; "reasonably equivalent value" finding (finding N); good-faith finding (paragraph S); injunctions (paragraphs 10 and 15); exculpation (paragraph 16)
  • Privacy disclosure cited: Character.AI Regional Privacy Disclosures, updated November 5, 2025, at character.ai/regional
  • Texas investigations: civil investigative demands dated December 31, 2024 and August 19, 2025
  • Sale hearing: December 3, 2026, 9:30 a.m. ET, continuing December 4
  • Debtor: Character Technologies, Inc., 700 El Camino Real, Suite 120, P.O. Box 1152, Menlo Park, CA 94025

Timeline

Summary

Who: A coalition of 39 states and the District of Columbia, represented mainly by the National Association of Attorneys General, and the State of Texas, objecting to the sale by Character Technologies, Inc., the company behind Character.ai, of a non-exclusive technology license and employee claims to Disney Worldwide Services, Inc., before Judge Brendan L. Shannon.

What: Two objections. The coalition (Docket No. 194) asks the court to deny the sale or, at a minimum, refuse assumption of the transition agreement signed the day after the petition, strike the retroactive-approval, "reasonably equivalent value" and exculpation provisions, deny Disney good-faith purchaser status and bar the transfer of user personal information absent compliance with state privacy law. Texas (Docket No. 195) joins it and asks the court to narrow the injunctions that would bar regulators, preserve claims against the former chief executive, reject a clause barring meetings with regulators without Disney's consent, and exclude Texas minors' data and sensitive data.

When: Both filed on November 18, 2026, the sale objection deadline. The company's reply is due November 30, the auction is December 1, and the sale hearing is December 3 and 4.

Where: The US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in Wilmington, case No. 26-11603 (BLS).

Why: Disney hired 66 of Character.ai's 86 employees before the filing, with about $180 million in pay and retention going to them and $20 million to the estate. The states argue the deal was never valued, cannot be tested at auction, was structured in Disney's favor and may carry users' chats inside the licensed technology. For the advertising and app economy, the outcome will show how far a bankrupt company's privacy promises, including a statement that it does "not sell personal information for monetary consideration," limit what it can sell.