France's data protection authority today published a €5 million fine against a life insurer that kept the passwords of more than 1.8 million customers in clear text, readable by anyone with access to its databases, and that let an eight-person team share a single login to a database holding the records of 1.3 million policyholders. The decision does not name the company.

The restricted committee of the Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the body that rules on sanctions, adopted decision SAN-2026-016 on November 12, 2026. It appeared on Légifrance today with the insurer called "company X" throughout and every detail that could identify it replaced by an ellipsis in square brackets. The committee found two breaches of Article 32 of the GDPR, which requires security appropriate to the risk, and two breaches of Article 5(1)(e), the rule that limits how long personal data can be kept. The rapporteur had first proposed €9 million, then €7 million. The committee settled on €5 million, issued no compliance order because the company had already fixed the problems, and agreed to publish without the company's name.

The amount is modest next to the CNIL's recent cookie cases. The reasoning behind it is less so. The committee calculated the fine on the turnover of the wider group to which the insurer is affiliated, over the company's objection that no capital link connected it to that group, and it measured the group's turnover as gross written premiums rather than the IFRS 17 "insurance revenue" figure the company argued for. For any insurer that belongs to a larger group, the decision is a written account of how the French regulator sizes its exposure.

In Short

France's privacy regulator fined a life insurance company €5 million because it kept more than 1.8 million customer passwords in readable form, let eight employees share logins to customer data, and held contact-form messages and login records for many years longer than it needed. The case matters to any business that runs customer accounts, because the regulator described password storage and individual logins as basic security duties and sized the fine on the revenue of the whole group, not just the company. The insurer had already fixed the problems, so it faces no order to change anything, and the decision was published without its name.

The company behind the "X"

What the decision reveals about the insurer is limited. It specialises in life insurance and sells savings products in the wealth sector, retirement savings plans and products used in estate planning, through its agencies or by phone. In 2024, 640 employees worked for an entity whose name is redacted, 522 of them on the insurer's life insurance business. The insurer is wholly owned by another company, which is affiliated to a group whose statutes, according to the decision, "organize common governance and financial solidarity" among its member companies.

Turnover, net result, the number of reception points in France and the group's revenue are all redacted. So is the name of the database, the access tool and the team at the centre of the case.

The quotations in this article are translated from the French text of the decision.

How the case reached the committee

The CNIL was alerted on December 27, 2023 about how the insurer kept passwords and answers to security questions, and about how long it retained data that users entered in the personal space of its website. The table below records the procedure as the decision sets it out.

Date Step
December 27, 2023 CNIL receives an alert on password and security-answer storage and on retention of personal-space data
March 27, 2024 CNIL president signs decision No. 2024-061C ordering a check of all processing by the company
May 14, 2024 CNIL delegation carries out an on-site inspection
May 16 and 23, July 18, 2024; March 28, October 10, November 7 and 28, 2025 Company sends further material to the delegation
March 4, 2026 Claude Castelluccia appointed rapporteur
March 16, 2026 Rapporteur's report, served March 17, proposes a fine, an injunction with a daily penalty, and publication
March 31 and April 8, 2026 Company asks for more time; deadline extended to April 30
April 30, 2026 Company's first written observations
May 29, 2026 Rapporteur's reply
June 29, 2026 Company's second observations (recorded as received June 30)
July 20, 2026 Investigation closed
August 1, 2026 Castelluccia's mandate ends
September 15, 2026 Company told that Benjamin Nguyen is the new rapporteur
October 15, 2026 Hearing before the restricted committee
November 12, 2026 Decision adopted
November 18, 2026 Decision published on Légifrance

The panel was chaired by Philippe-Pierre Cabourdin, with Vincent Lesclous as vice-president and Didier Kling and Éric Thiers as members. At the hearing the company was informed of its right to remain silent and had the floor last. Among the texts the decision relies on is a ruling of the Constitutional Council, decision No. 2025-1154 QPC of August 8, 2025, alongside the general principle guaranteeing the rights of the defence to anyone facing a punitive procedure, "which includes the right to be silent."

Nobody contested who was responsible. The insurer lists itself in its register of processing activities as the data controller for managing insurance contracts, from subscription to execution, and did not dispute that status in either set of written observations.

Passwords anyone with database access could read

Article 32 obliges a controller, "taking into account the state of knowledge, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing as well as the risks," to implement "appropriate technical and organizational measures in order to guarantee a level of security appropriate to the risk."

The committee began from first principles. "The safe storage of passwords is a basic precaution in the protection of personal data," the decision says, and it traced that expectation back more than a decade.

Reference cited in the decision Date What it says
ANSSI bulletin CERTA-2013-ACT-046 November 15, 2013 Passwords should "be stored in a form transformed by a one-way cryptographic function (hash function) and slow to calculate such as PBKDF2", with a random salt "to prevent an attack by precalculated tables"
ANSSI recommendations on multi-factor authentication and passwords No date given "Recommended cryptographic hash functions, such as the SHA2 family, are very quick to execute functions, which, in the context of password storage, is an advantage for attackers"
CNIL deliberation No. 2017-012 January 19, 2017 Passwords transformed by a "non-reversible and secure cryptographic function", "integrating the use of a salt or a key"
CNIL GDPR Developer's Guide January 27, 2020 Storage "using a proven library, such as Argon2, yescrypt, scrypt, balloon, bcrypt and, to a lesser extent, PBKDF2"
CNIL deliberation No. 2022-100 (passwords recommendation) July 21, 2022 Confirms the 2017 recommendation

From those sources the committee drew a working definition: a mathematically proven, deliberately slow hash function, with a random salt of at least 128 bits for each password, so that attackers cannot use tables of passwords and their fingerprints computed in advance.

The insurer was nowhere near it. According to the rapporteur's findings, it kept the passwords of more than 1.8 million customers in clear in the table that stores customer login data, and 730,289 of those passwords were also kept in clear in a log table. Where it did transform passwords, it used ORA_HASH, a hash function built into Oracle's database software, which the decision calls obsolete, without a cryptographic salt.

The sequence of fixes is set out in unflattering detail. Only after the inspection, in an email of July 18, 2024, did the company say it had applied a first hash function - ORA_HASH. Only on April 25, 2026, after the sanction report had been served, did it move to a function the committee accepts as state of the art: Argon2 with a salt, according to the company's defence. By PPC Land's calculation, that left a little over 23 months between the inspection and the switch, a period during which, in the committee's words, the risk of compromise of personal data accessible with those passwords continued.

The company did not dispute any of this. It stressed how quickly it had reacted and pointed out that no security incident had compromised the data. Its stronger objection concerned what the passwords protected. The rapporteur had argued that they gave access to health and banking data. The company replied that a table collecting contact forms sent to account managers sat entirely outside the customer's personal space and could not be reached with a customer's login, and that bank details shown in the personal space were truncated to the last three digits of the IBAN.

The rapporteur accepted the point on health data and dropped it. On bank data, the committee found something more awkward: in an extract of the contact-form table supplied during the inspection, several customers had typed their full IBAN into forms sent from the "My letters" section of their personal space. It also accepted that this table could not be reached with the password protecting the personal space.

That did not save the company. Storing passwords in clear, the committee held, made all personal data in customer areas vulnerable, data "which may contain financial data, no matter whether this vulnerability has been exploited or not by an attacker." The breach was established for the period from the inspection until the sanction report was served.

Eight people, one password

The second Article 32 finding concerned two accounts that several people used under one set of credentials.

The first was a generic application account through which the company reached a database holding all information on its 1.3 million customers with a life insurance contract in force. In effect a service account, an identity meant for software, it was being used by people: its access was shared by the eight people in one of the company's teams. The second was the administrator account of a tool the company used to view every table in its database. On the day of the inspection, its password was shared by the same eight people.

The committee set out three reasons why shared accounts are, as the decision puts it, "in principle contrary to Article 32 of the GDPR." They undermine an authorisation policy designed to limit each category of user to the data it needs, the logic of least-privilege access. They destroy traceability, since only individual accounts record who did what, which makes a fraudulent access, a deletion or a corruption of data much harder to attribute. And a password shared among several people is no longer secret or individual.

It also repeated language from an earlier sanction, SAN-2021-008 of June 14, 2021: "the assignment of a unique identifier per user and the prohibition of shared accounts are among the essential precautions to ensure effective traceability of access to a database." Without that, the committee noted, there is no reliable audit trail to identify fraudulent access or the author of a deletion carried out through the shared account.

The company's defence was partly about timing and partly about representativeness. It said it had created named accounts in November 2025, each with a unique identifier and a strictly personal password, and had revised the application account's permissions so that only application processes could use it, with a password generated at deployment and never stored or shared. The committee accepted that the team had a genuine need for access to the database, for technical data analysis and business questions, but found that until June 2026 the company had not proved that the shared access had been deactivated or deleted.

On the administrator account, the insurer argued that the generic login used during the on-site inspection did not reflect how access to the tool was normally managed, since team members had always had individual accounts. It deactivated the generic account on April 22, 2026. The committee held that "only individual accounts, including a unique identifier per user, guarantee a level of security adapted to the risk," and found the breach established for the past.

The password rule that passed

One complaint did not survive. The rapporteur had also attacked the insurer's password policy: when customers reset a password from their personal space, the site accepted eight to fifteen characters, with at least one uppercase letter, one lowercase letter and one number.

Measured against the CNIL's 2022 recommendation, which the decision describes as not mandatory but a "relevant light" on what security requires, that policy only passes with an extra safeguard. The company showed that one existed on the day of the checks: customer accounts were blocked automatically after several failed login attempts. The rapporteur dropped the complaint, and the committee found it was not established in any case.

Configuration Minimum set by CNIL recommendation No. 2022-100, as cited in the decision
Password only 12 characters with uppercase, lowercase, numbers and special characters chosen from a list of at least 37
Password only 14 characters with uppercase, lowercase and numbers, no special character required
Password only A passphrase of at least 7 words
Password plus a complementary measure 8 characters from 3 categories, plus a measure such as escalating lockout times, a captcha, or blocking the account after at most 10 failed attempts
The insurer's reset rule 8 to 15 characters with at least one uppercase letter, one lowercase letter and one number; automatic blocking after several failed attempts

Thirteen years of messages, 21 years of logins

Article 5(1)(e) of the GDPR requires personal data to be "kept in a form that allows the identification of data subjects for a period not exceeding that necessary for the purposes for which they are processed." Once that purpose is achieved, the decision says, data must be deleted, anonymised, or moved to intermediate archiving for a fixed period where a legal obligation or potential litigation requires it.

The first retention breach concerned the contact form in the customer area. Since November 2010, the insurer had kept in one table the details customers entered, their messages and any attachments. The oldest message was dated November 27, 2010, more than 13 years before the inspection; the rapporteur counted 14 years. Bank details were among the data. The retention was all the more excessive, the rapporteur noted, because each form was also archived as a PDF in an electronic document management tool once an account manager took up the request. The company said it would keep the forms in its active database after the end of the contractual relationship. The committee's answer was blunt: the information "cannot be kept for an extended period once the request for information has been processed."

The second concerned the log table that records every login attempt, used to check the details a customer enters, manage technical incidents and detect fraudulent access. The company's own retention policy set one year for the identifiers and passwords stored there. The inspectors found connection data entered on February 3, 2003, and passwords belonging to 8,628 customers kept since July 11, 2019. The committee described retention of up to 21 years, beyond both the company's own policy and anything the purpose required.

Data Policy or stated practice Found at the May 14, 2024 inspection What the company changed
Contact-form details, messages and attachments, including some full IBANs Kept in the active database after the contract ended Oldest message dated November 27, 2010 From July 10, 2024: history deleted and a monthly purge over 12 rolling months; the committee later records deletion one month after receipt
Login log table: identifiers and passwords as typed by customers One year, under the company's retention policy Connection data from February 3, 2003; passwords of 8,628 customers kept since July 11, 2019 From July 10, 2024: password columns no longer filled, existing unhashed passwords deleted, monthly purge of data older than 12 months

The company did not dispute either breach, and it told the CNIL on July 18, 2024 that the fixes were in place. The committee found both breaches established for the past, adding that the excessive retention concerned the data of more than 8,600 customers. Its broader point, borrowed from its October 29, 2021 decision SAN-2021-019, is that a retention policy only counts if it is actually applied.

How the committee set the fine, step by step

According to the decision, the committee worked through the following stages.

  1. Controller. It confirmed under Article 4(7) of the GDPR that the insurer was the controller for marketing, subscribing and monitoring its life insurance products.
  2. Breaches. It found two breaches of Article 32 (password storage; shared accounts) and two of Article 5(1)(e) (contact-form data; login logs), and rejected the complaint on password robustness.
  3. Gravity under Article 83(2)(a). It treated password storage and access management as "basic security obligations," noted the very large number of people affected, and stressed that the clear-text storage left customer data potentially vulnerable until the fix of April 25, 2026.
  4. Negligence under Article 83(2)(b). It recalled that the CNIL communicates regularly on authentication rules and that the company had not followed its own one-year retention period, concluding that the insurer had been "at the very least, particularly negligent."
  5. Categories of data under Article 83(2)(g). It held that data made vulnerable by clear-text passwords called for "particular vigilance."
  6. Ceiling. It set the maximum at €20 million or, for a company, 4% of total worldwide annual turnover for the previous financial year, whichever is higher.
  7. Undertaking. It treated the group and the insurer as a single economic entity, so the group's figures set the scale.
  8. Turnover measure. It used the group's gross written premiums for 2025, a figure the decision redacts.
  9. Amount. It imposed €5 million, describing it as proportionate and dissuasive given the companies' responsibilities and financial capacity.
  10. Injunction and publication. It issued no injunction and ordered publication on the CNIL website and Légifrance without the company's name.

How €9 million became €5 million

The amount moved twice before the committee fixed it.

Stage Date Proposed or imposed Basis stated in the decision
Rapporteur's report March 16, 2026 €9 million Group turnover for 2024; capital links and financial solidarity as evidence of a single economic entity
After the company's observations Rapporteur's reply, May 29, 2026 €7 million Same basis; sensitive data dropped from the Article 32 breach, bank data kept
Restricted committee November 12, 2026 €5 million Group gross written premiums for 2025

By PPC Land's calculation, the final fine is 44% below the first proposal and 29% below the second. Because the decision redacts the group's premiums, it is not possible to express the fine as a share of the base the committee used.

The company's challenge to the base came on two fronts. First, it argued that there was no capital link between the group and itself, that the rapporteur had not shown the group exercised decisive influence over its conduct, and that the group's articles of association could not by themselves prove such influence. On its reading, the widest base available was the turnover of its own parent company.

The committee rejected that with a chain of European case law. In Deutsche Wohnen (C-807/21, December 5, 2023), the Court of Justice of the European Union held that GDPR fines must be calculated on the concept of an "undertaking" from competition law, which "designates an economic unit even if, from a legal point of view, that economic unit consists of several natural or legal persons." Ilva (C-383/23, February 13, 2025) confirmed it. And in Sumal (C-882/19, October 6, 2021), the court held that an economic unit exists where there are "economic, organizational and legal" links between a parent entity and a controlled one, capital control being only one particular case.

Applied to the insurer, that meant a 100% capital link between the insurer and its parent, statutes giving the group a "dominant influence" over its member companies, and the group's publication of combined accounts under French accounting standards. The insurer, the committee noted, offered no factual evidence that it had the operational and decision-making autonomy to depart from that influence.

The second front was more technical, and more specific to insurance. The company argued that the relevant measure of turnover for a life insurer is "insurance revenue" under the international accounting standard IFRS 17. The committee went to the European Data Protection Board's guidelines on calculating fines, which define turnover by reference to Article 2(5) of Directive 2013/34/EU. That directive, for insurers, points to Articles 35 and 66 of Directive 91/674/EEC, under which "net turnover" is replaced by gross premiums written.

The decision explains the difference. IFRS 17 insurance revenue covers costs and commissions acquired by the insurer, while gross premiums written refer, "by materializing the insurer's commitment to the persons it covers, to the price of the services rendered by the insurer taking into account his assessment of the potential risk to come at the time of the subscription." Because the insurer is a French company that keeps its accounts under French standards, the committee held that IFRS 17 did not apply.

No order, and no name

The rapporteur had asked for an injunction with a daily penalty to bring the processing into line with Article 32. The company argued that it had already deployed the necessary measures during the procedure, and the committee agreed that, given compliance on every breach found, no injunction was needed.

Publication was the more contested question. The rapporteur asked for the decision to be made public with the company's name removed after two years. The company objected that publicity could damage its reputation over "definitively resolved breaches" and "would weaken the trust that its customers place in it for the management of their savings, while favoring its competitors." It added that the breaches were neither systemic nor linked to a commercial practice of interest to the general public.

The committee split the difference in the company's favour. Publication was justified, it held, given the breaches and the number of people involved, "the methods of storing passwords being, in particular, one of the essential security rules that all insurance actors, one of whose missions is to protect the insured against the vagaries of life, must apply." But "a publication of the decision without the company being identified by name is sufficient." The rapporteur had proposed naming the insurer for two years; the committee removed the name from the start.

That contrasts with the CNIL's other recent decisions. When the committee fined IQVIA €5 million in May 2026, it named the company and calculated the fine against the IQVIA group as an economic unit, using the group's 2023 revenue of $15 billion as the reference. When it fined two Fnac Darty companies a combined €7 million in October 2026 over a recommendation tracker that kept running after users refused consent, the companies were named despite arguing against publication.

The insurer can appeal to the Council of State within two months of notification. That court has shown it will intervene on amounts: in December 2025 it cut the CNIL's fine on Amazon's French logistics arm from €32 million to €15 million, while in March 2026 it upheld Criteo's €40 million fine.

Why it matters beyond one insurer

The facts are specific to a life insurer, but the systems are not. Customer portals, loyalty accounts, contact forms and login logs are standard parts of the stack that marketing and customer-relationship teams depend on, and each of them appears in this decision. The committee treated clear-text password storage as a breach regardless of whether anyone exploited it, and it treated a team sharing one login to customer data as a breach in principle.

Advertising platforms have been moving toward individual, stronger authentication on their own terms. In May, Google Ads said it would require passkeys for certain sensitive actions from July 15, 2026, including changes to user access and account linking. Regulators elsewhere have drawn the same line between who can see customer data and who can be shown to have seen it. Italy's Garante fined Intesa Sanpaolo €31.8 million after one employee made 6,637 queries into the data of 3,573 customers without a documented professional reason. The Garante's €1.7 million fine on Wind Tre, adopted in May 2026, turned in part on how passwords were kept at points of sale.

Password storage matters most when something goes wrong. The UK's Information Commissioner's Office fined 23andMe £2.31 million in June 2025 after a credential stuffing attack affected 155,592 UK customers. In Spain, an access-control flaw at EVO Banco exposed 1,275,049 people's records and cost Bankinter €240,000. In the French case, the company pointed to the absence of any security incident, and the committee did not suggest otherwise: the fine rests on what could have happened.

On retention, the decision fits a pattern of regulators insisting that deletion is a real, verifiable act. The Saxony-Anhalt data protection authority said in a guide dated September 2026 that moving files to a recycle bin does not count as deletion under the GDPR. The CNIL went further here, holding a company to the one-year period it had written into its own policy and then ignored.

The fine-setting method may prove the most durable part. The group-turnover approach is now routine at the CNIL, as the IQVIA and Fnac cases show, but this decision carries it into a group held together by statutes and financial solidarity rather than straightforward share ownership, and it fixes gross written premiums as the turnover measure for insurers. Whether that holds on appeal is another matter. An analysis PPC Land covered in May found that roughly €2.8 billion of the €7.1 billion in GDPR fines announced since 2018, nearly 40%, had been annulled or was under challenge.

The decision leaves several things unsaid. It does not identify the insurer, its parent or its group, and it redacts every turnover and premium figure, so the fine cannot be measured against the base used to set it. It does not explain how the committee moved from the €7 million proposal to €5 million beyond the Article 83 criteria. One passage refers to "nearly 1.8 million" passwords, while the others say more than 1.8 million, and the company's July 2024 description of a 12-month rolling purge for contact-form data differs from the one-month deletion the committee records later. The security-question answers mentioned in the original alert do not reappear in the findings.

Key facts

  • Authority: Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), restricted committee: Philippe-Pierre Cabourdin (president), Vincent Lesclous (vice-president), Didier Kling, Éric Thiers
  • Decision: Deliberation of the restricted committee No. SAN-2026-016 of November 12, 2026, "pronouncing a financial penalty against company X"
  • Publication: Légifrance, Wednesday, November 18, 2026 (Légifrance ID CNILTEXT000055097962); also ordered for the CNIL website
  • Source URL: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/cnil/id/CNILTEXT000055097962
  • Sanctioned party: "company X", a French life insurer, not named; 640 employees in 2024 at a redacted entity, 522 on its life insurance business
  • Penalty: €5,000,000 administrative fine; no injunction; publication without the company's name
  • Breaches found: GDPR Article 32 (clear-text and weakly hashed password storage; shared accounts for database and tool access); GDPR Article 5(1)(e) (contact-form data since November 2010; login log data up to 21 years)
  • Complaint rejected: password robustness (8 to 15 characters, account blocking after failed attempts)
  • Key numbers: more than 1.8 million passwords in clear; 730,289 also in clear in a log table; 1.3 million customers in the shared-access database; 8 people sharing the accounts; 8,628 customers' passwords retained since July 11, 2019
  • Proposals: €9 million (rapporteur's report, March 16, 2026), €7 million (after the company's observations)
  • Fine basis: group gross written premiums for 2025 (redacted); IFRS 17 insurance revenue rejected
  • Fixes recorded: contact-form and log purges from July 10, 2024; named database accounts November 2025; generic tool account deactivated April 22, 2026; Argon2 with salt April 25, 2026
  • Procedure: inspection decision No. 2024-061C (March 27, 2024); on-site inspection May 14, 2024; rapporteurs Claude Castelluccia, then Benjamin Nguyen; hearing October 15, 2026
  • Case law and texts cited: CJEU C-807/21 Deutsche Wohnen (December 5, 2023); CJEU C-383/23 Ilva (February 13, 2025); CJEU C-882/19 Sumal (October 6, 2021); Directive 2013/34/EU Article 2(5); Directive 91/674/EEC Articles 35 and 66; CNIL recommendation No. 2022-100; Constitutional Council decision No. 2025-1154 QPC (August 8, 2025)
  • Appeal: to the Council of State within two months of notification

Timeline

Summary

Who: The restricted committee of the CNIL, France's data protection authority, sanctioned a French life insurer identified only as "company X", wholly owned by a parent that is affiliated to a wider insurance group.

What: A €5 million fine for storing more than 1.8 million customer passwords in clear text or with an obsolete unsalted hash, letting eight employees share logins to a database of 1.3 million policyholders and to an administrator tool, and keeping contact-form messages for more than 13 years and login data for up to 21 years. The fine was calculated on the group's gross written premiums, there is no compliance order, and the company is not named.

When: The decision was adopted on November 12, 2026 and published on Légifrance today, November 18, 2026, following an alert on December 27, 2023 and an on-site inspection on May 14, 2024.

Where: France, under the GDPR and the French Data Protection Act, concerning the insurer's customer website and internal databases; any appeal goes to the Council of State.

Why: The committee held that password storage and individual access accounts are basic security obligations, that retention rules count only if applied, and that the economic weight of the whole group, measured in the way EU accounting law measures insurers' turnover, should set the size of the fine.