The Investigatory Powers Tribunal today rejected the Home Office's argument that national security would be damaged if it confirmed whether it had given Apple a technical capability notice under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, clearing the way for most of Apple's challenge to that notice to be heard in public.
In Short
A UK court that hears complaints about surveillance ruled today that the government can no longer keep secret the fact that it served Apple with a technical capability notice, a legal order under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The judges found that officials had already confirmed the notice to The Times and the Financial Times, and that the government had let Apple brief senior US officials, so official silence was protecting nothing. Most of Apple's legal challenge can now be argued in open court, although what the notice actually requires Apple to do stays secret for now.
Two claims, three judgments
The OPEN judgment, neutral citation [2026] UKIPTrib 9, runs to 24 pages and is dated 19 November 2026. It was given jointly by Lady Carmichael, the tribunal's President, Mr Justice Chamberlain and Mr Justice Johnson, after a hearing on 17 September 2026. It deals with two cases together. The first is Apple Inc's claim against the Secretary of State for the Home Department, case IPT/26/191/CH. The second, case IPT/25/83-86/CH, was brought against the same respondent by Privacy International, Liberty, Ian Hosein and Ben Wizner, whom the judgment calls "the NGOs" throughout.
Two further judgments, one PRIVATE and one CLOSED, were handed down at the same time. Those will not be published. According to the tribunal, "The substance of our decision and reasoning is set out in this judgment. The PRIVATE and CLOSED judgments contain additional details that cannot be published without damaging the public interest."
The dispute has a history. Apple first brought a claim against the Home Secretary in early 2025. At that stage, according to the judgment, the Home Office argued that the existence of the claim itself had to be kept secret and that any hearing should not appear in the daily case list. The tribunal disagreed. It published a listing that withheld the parties' names, heard argument, and then, in OPEN, PRIVATE and CLOSED judgments dated 7 April 2025, rejected the government's request to keep both the identities of the parties and the subject matter secret. That is how it became public that Apple had sued the Home Secretary over the power to give a "relevant operator" a technical capability notice.
The NGOs filed their claim shortly afterwards, and it was listed for a full hearing in December 2026. Apple's first claim, meanwhile, was dismissed "because of a change of circumstances" - a phrase the judgment does not explain further. In July 2026, Apple started a second claim.
A case management hearing was then listed, partly to decide whether a December 2026 trial was still realistic. It was not. According to the judgment, the parties agree that a substantive hearing in December 2026 is impractical and indicate that they are likely to agree directions "with a view to a substantive hearing in the first half of 2027."
The question put to the three judges was narrower than the case as a whole, but it shapes everything that follows. Would it damage the public interest to reveal whether the Home Secretary has given Apple a technical capability notice, and, if so, what it contains? The answer decides how much of the eventual trial takes place in public, and how much evidence can be exchanged in OPEN rather than PRIVATE or CLOSED sessions.
What each side argued
The government relied on its long-standing policy known as neither confirm nor deny, or NCND. According to the judgment, "It is in furtherance of this policy that the Government has publicly neither confirmed nor denied whether Apple has been given a technical capability notice."
Neil Sheldon KC, for the Home Secretary, argued that NCND only works if it is applied consistently, and that "Official confirmation or denial of the existence of a technical capability notice in this case would create a damaging precedent for future national security cases." He drew a distinction between media speculation and formal confirmation by government, and asked the tribunal to give substantial weight to the Home Office's own assessment of the risk.
Ben Jaffey KC, for the NGOs, argued that NCND was "no longer tenable" in the light of the reporting and official statements. The sequence of events, in his account, told its own story: Apple's first claim was dismissed and a second one brought, which mirrored public reports that a notice had been issued, withdrawn under US pressure and then reissued. The judgment records his submission that "it follows as a matter of irresistible inference that it is now in the public domain that the Secretary of State has given Apple a technical capability notice."
Daniel Beard KC, for Apple, was, according to the tribunal, "constrained in what he could say in OPEN pending the Tribunal's resolution of this issue." He asked for permission for Apple to refer openly to "certain key facts", including whether a notice had in fact been given. Without that permission, he argued, Apple "would otherwise be unfairly prevented from publicly advancing facts it knows to be true."
Jason Beer KC, appointed as counsel to the tribunal, made no substantive submissions in OPEN. In the PRIVATE session, according to the judgment, he backed the NGOs' position and argued that the government's PRIVATE and CLOSED evidence did not show that disclosure would damage national security. He also pointed out that the respondent's documents explaining the true position were marked "OFFICIAL SENSITIVE" rather than "SECRET" or "TOP SECRET", which he said was inconsistent with the claim that disclosure would be damaging.
The Home Office's evidence
The government's case rested on two witness statements. The first, from Lucy Montgomery-Pott, Head of the Investigatory Powers Unit in the Home Office's Homeland Security Group, was served for the April 2025 hearing and only in PRIVATE. She said there had been an investigation into The Times's reference to Home Office sources confirming the order, and that "no Government source has been identified".
The tribunal was unimpressed by what that statement left out. According to the judgment, she "provided no detail of the investigation undertaken and no copy of any investigation report. She did not identify who had been investigated, or what investigative steps had been taken (for example whether electronic devices had been examined)." Nor did she say whether ministers, senior officials or special advisers had been asked if anyone authorised a briefing.
The second witness was Andrew Scurry, Director of Technology, Data and Innovation in the Homeland Security Group, who gave OPEN and PRIVATE statements dated 11 September 2026. He adopted Ms Montgomery-Pott's views and argued that "the NCND principle is only effective when it is maintained consistently." He also said that "Ministers and Home Office officials have consistently neither confirmed nor denied the existence, contents, scope or operational effect of any individual TCN."
The judges' response to that sentence was blunt: "If that sentence were true, then the statements in The Times and The Financial Times to the contrary effect would be false."
On the later Financial Times articles, Mr Scurry said that "Both of these Financial Times articles were subject to a leak investigation by Government Security Group." Again, according to the tribunal, "no further detail is given of what this investigation involved, nor indeed of what (if anything) it revealed."
One absence carried particular weight. The government's evidence, the judgment notes, "does not include any assessment that damage had been caused to national security" as a result of the tribunal's April 2025 decision to publish the existence of Apple's claim and its subject matter.
The public record the tribunal weighed
The judgment sets out the reporting and statements in detail. The table below records them as the tribunal describes them.
| Date | Source | What the judgment records |
|---|---|---|
| Before April 2025 (date not given) | The Times | Report that the Home Office issued an order under the 2016 Act to require Apple to provide access to encrypted material, "confirmed by Home Office sources" |
| Before April 2025 (date not given) | Tulsi Gabbard, then US Director of National Intelligence, and statements attributed to the US President | Summarised at paragraphs 14-19 of the April 2025 OPEN judgment |
| 20 July 2025 | Financial Times | "two senior British officials" said the government was "seeking a way out of a clash with the Trump administration over the UK's demand that Apple provide it with access to secure customer data" |
| 19 August 2025 | Tulsi Gabbard, post on X | Viewed more than three million times; said the UK "agreed to drop its mandate for Apple to provide a 'back door'" |
| 19 August 2025 | Financial Times | Headline: "UK has 'agreed to drop' demand for access to Apple user data, says US" |
| 1 October 2025 | Financial Times | Headline: "UK makes new attempt to access Apple cloud data"; sub-headline referred to an "Order issued in September" |
| Shortly before 17 September 2026 | Letter from Senator Ron Wyden and Congressman Warren Davidson, also published by The Guardian | Said the UK government let Apple brief the US Attorney General and Vice President but barred it from briefing Congress |
The 20 July 2025 article, according to the judgment, also quoted an official in "the UK's technology department" as saying: "This is something that the vice-president is very annoyed about and which needs to be resolved... The Home Office is basically going to have to back down."
Ms Gabbard's post on X, as quoted in full in the judgment, read: "Over the past few months, I've been working closely with our partners in the UK, alongside @POTUS and @VP, to ensure Americans' private data remains private and our Constitutional rights and civil liberties are protected. As a result, the UK has agreed to drop its mandate for Apple to provide a 'back door' that would have enabled access to the protected encrypted data of American citizens and encroached on our civil liberties."
Six weeks later the picture had changed again. The 1 October 2025 Financial Times article's sub-headline, as quoted by the tribunal, was "Order issued in September comes after Trump administration said London had backed down in fight over encryption". The Home Office told the newspaper that it did not comment on operational matters and would neither confirm nor deny the existence of any technical capability notice. The same article, however, reported that "two senior British government figures said the US administration was no longer leaning on the UK government to rescind the order."
The last item came from Washington, shortly before the September 2026 hearing. Senator Wyden and Congressman Davidson wrote to the tribunal asking for greater transparency into "the challenge reportedly filed by Apple concerning a surveillance directive from the UK government under the Investigatory Powers Act." According to the letter, as quoted in the judgment: "Apple recently informed Congress that it is challenging the UK government's authority to issue surveillance directives. Apple sought permission from the UK government to discuss this issue in more detail with both the executive and legislative branches of the US government. Apple further informed Congress that the UK government granted Apple permission to brief the Attorney General, the Vice President, and their staff, while explicitly prohibiting the company from discussing the issue in further detail with the US Congress."
Why the tribunal set the Home Office's assessment aside
UK courts normally give national security assessments by the executive considerable deference. The judgment restates the standard position from Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman and later cases: such assessments "should usually be accepted, unless they are shown to be irrational or otherwise vitiated by a public law error."
That deference has conditions. The tribunal quoted the Divisional Court in Attorney General v BBC; R (Beth) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2025] EWHC 1669 (KB) - a panel on which Mr Justice Chamberlain also sat - at paragraph 19: "this respect is warranted only if, and to the extent that, the courts can have confidence without reservation in the processes by which such assessments are prepared and presented."
NCND, the judgment adds, "is not an absolute or blanket rule of law". It quoted the Court of Appeal in Mohamed v Secretary of State for the Home Department: "It is not simply a matter of a governmental party to litigation hoisting the NCND flag and the court automatically saluting it". And there is a further point the tribunal treated as decisive: "If the Government itself has not been consistent in maintaining NCND in respect of a particular matter, the court is unlikely to give weight to an assertion that a departure from NCND would be damaging to national security."
The reasoning then proceeds in steps.
The newspaper briefings. Two reputable newspapers reported that government officials confirmed the notice. The judges accepted that journalists sometimes describe sources imprecisely, but found it "difficult to see any source protection reason why The Times and The Financial Times should have described their sources as Government officials if they were not either a member of the Government or a civil servant or special adviser." They also noted that Mr Sheldon did not ask them to find the reporting untruthful or materially misleading.
The leak investigations. The assertion that investigations had not found a government source, according to the tribunal, "has little or no evidential value in the absence of any further detail about what the investigations involved."
Authorisation. The judges inferred that it was "extremely unlikely that multiple Government sources would have briefed the media in the absence of authorisation", because those sources would otherwise have risked disciplinary and criminal proceedings "for no evident personal gain." Conversely, they found "nothing inherently unlikely" about a government that formally maintains NCND in public "whilst at the same time informally departing from NCND by providing briefings to journalists (to provide a narrative that might have political or diplomatic benefit)."
Evidence the government chose not to file. The Home Office could have given the tribunal the investigation reports, in CLOSED if necessary, or filed direct evidence from ministers or senior officials that the briefings were unauthorised. The tribunal was told it is not usual practice for a Government Security Group investigation to be disclosed, even to the sponsoring department. Its response: "That is nothing to the point." On both counts, according to the judgment, the respondent "has chosen not to do so."
The finding that followed, at paragraph 40, is stated without qualification: "In all the circumstances, we infer that the briefings that are reported by The Times and The Financial Times did take place, and that they were authorised by Government Ministers or senior department officials or special advisers. This amounts to a significant departure from NCND."
The US briefings. Confidential briefings to a foreign intelligence partner would not normally undermine NCND, the judges said, because "ordinarily, intelligence partners respect confidences." This case was different. "Here, however, it was abundantly clear by April 2025 that the most senior US officials and politicians were not prepared to keep secret what they regarded as an egregious breach of the First Amendment rights of US citizens." Against that background, the decision to authorise Apple to brief members of the US executive, "without any apparent assurance of confidentiality, amounted to a further clear departure from NCND."
The cumulative conclusion, at paragraph 42, contains the judgment's most quoted line: "anyone with even a passing interest in this topic already knows that the respondent has served a technical capability notice on Apple. We use the word 'knows' advisedly."
The tribunal then considered who might benefit from official confirmation. It divided potential "malign actors" into two groups: sophisticated ones, including some adversary states, and less well-informed people contemplating lower-level terrorist or criminal activity. Confirmation, it found, would give the first group "no information whatsoever that they do not already have". As for the second, "anyone in the second category who is remotely interested in discovering whether a technical capability notice had been served on Apple could already find the answer to that question with ease."
A chatbot answer in the reasoning
One illustration in that passage stands out. According to the judgment: "We were told, for example, that an affirmative answer, backed by reference to the press reporting we have discussed, can be found by simply typing the question into Google's chatbot." The tribunal concluded that "the suggestion that official confirmation would add materially to the stock of information available to a unsophisticated malign actor seems to us to be fanciful."
The judgment records this as something the judges were told. It does not name the product, does not say who ran the query or when, and does not say whether the tribunal checked the answer itself. Still, a surveillance court citing what an AI chatbot says as a measure of what is already public is a notable detail. The answer such a system gives is assembled from the same press reporting the government declined to acknowledge.
From those findings, the tribunal said it did "not give any significant weight" to the Home Office's assessment. It went further, describing that assessment as "flawed in the public law sense because it fails to take into account or properly grapple with a critical material consideration", namely the extensive departures from NCND that, on the tribunal's findings, had been authorised.
The operative conclusion, at paragraph 44, is where the judgment states the fact itself: "we agree with the NGOs and with Apple that the respondent has not established that it would be damaging to national security to reveal in these proceedings, as is the case, that the respondent has given Apple a technical capability notice."
How the tribunal splits its hearings
The judgment describes the three-tier procedure the tribunal used for this hearing and expects to use at trial. According to the judgment, it works as follows.
- OPEN. The hearing is held in public with all parties represented. This judgment is the OPEN judgment.
- PRIVATE. The NGOs are excluded. Apple and the Home Office remain, and counsel to the tribunal, Jason Beer KC, advances submissions that support the NGOs' interests.
- CLOSED. Both the NGOs and Apple are excluded. Counsel to the tribunal advances submissions supporting their interests.
- The disclosure rule. All three tiers are governed by rule 7(1) of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules 2018, which states: "The Tribunal must carry out their functions in such a way as to secure that information is not disclosed to an extent, or in a manner, that is contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime, the economic well-being of the United Kingdom or the continued discharge of the functions of any of the intelligence services."
- The NCND test. According to the judgment, "If a departure from NCND in a particular case would involve damage to national security then rule 7 requires that the Tribunal carries out its functions in a manner that would enable the Government to maintain NCND in that case. If, conversely, a departure from NCND would not involve damage to national security then rule 7 does not prevent the Tribunal from conducting an OPEN hearing".
- The duty of candour. A party relying on NCND must tell the court about any departure from it. The tribunal quoted paragraph 27 of BBC and Beth, which requires that the court be "candidly informed (if necessary in CLOSED pursuant to a public interest immunity application or a closed material procedure)" about any relevant NCND policy and "the circumstances of any departure from NCND in the particular case or other related cases and the precise terms of the departure (including whether the departure was authorised, whether the information was conveyed in confidence and the precise terms of any departure)." Paragraph 28 adds that where it is unclear whether a departure occurred, "any material which evidences or suggests that there has been must always be candidly disclosed to the court".
The tribunal also published, for the first time in OPEN, parts of its PRIVATE April 2025 judgment. One passage notes that NCND "is not a blanket rule and its utility is not defeated by occasional and exceptional departures from its application", and lists earlier departures: the Wilson doctrine on the interception of Parliamentarians' communications, the Secret Intelligence Service's evidence at the inquest into the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, a 2012 Foreign Secretary answer about Nigel Heywood, and evidence about Gareth Williams' employment.
Apple's five grounds and where they will be heard
The practical consequence, according to the judgment, is that "much of the substantive hearing in these claims can take place in OPEN." The tribunal went through Apple's five grounds of challenge one by one.
| Ground | Subject, as described in the judgment | Where the tribunal expects it to be decided |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Whether the Home Secretary has power to issue warrants for targeted interception of communications outside the United Kingdom | Entirely in OPEN (statutory interpretation, no evidence needed) |
| 2 | Whether the statutory power can be used to regulate the security or privacy services a technology company offers its customers | Entirely in OPEN (statutory interpretation, no evidence needed) |
| 3 | The consultation process | Substance largely in OPEN |
| 4 | Whether the notice is a disproportionate interference with qualified rights under the European Convention on Human Rights | First three proportionality tests largely in OPEN; the fourth may involve evidence damaging to the public interest |
| 5 | Whether Apple has been treated differently from other technology companies | Likely to involve evidence that cannot be disclosed in OPEN |
The fourth ground applies the four-stage test from Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39. According to the judgment, the tests are "(1) whether the objective of the measure is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a protected right, (2) whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective, (3) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the achievement of the objective, and (4) whether, balancing the severity of the measure's effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, the former outweighs the latter."
The second ground matters most beyond Apple. Whether a power in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 can be used to regulate the security or privacy features a technology company sells to its customers is a question that applies to every operator the Act can reach. The tribunal's expectation is that this question will now be argued and decided in public.
What stays secret
The ruling covers the existence of the notice, not its contents. According to the judgment, "there has been no publication of its precise content. All parties recognise that there may be matters of detail that must be kept secret in order to preserve national security and the public interest."
The tribunal agreed that full disclosure of everything, including the content of the notice and the evidence of Apple and the Home Office, would damage national security. But it declined to draw the boundary now. That line, it said, can only be drawn once the parties have exchanged evidence and written arguments. If the first two grounds can be decided entirely in OPEN, the question of whether other details can be published may not need to be confronted at all. The judgment also raises the possibility that parts of the hearing "could be litigated on the basis of assumed facts, or on the basis of highly generalised gists of the actual facts."
The outcome paragraph, paragraph 51, reads in full: "We reject the respondent's contention that it would be damaging to national security to confirm the fact that the respondent has given Apple a technical capability notice. The extent, if at all, to which some of the detail of the technical capability notice may be disclosed without damaging national security or the public interest is better addressed separately, after disclosure of evidence and when the precise issues to be determined at the hearing are clear."
Why this matters beyond Apple
For the advertising and marketing industry, the case sits at the junction of two forces that have grown harder to separate: the privacy features platforms sell to their users, and the access governments demand to the data those platforms hold. Apple markets privacy and encryption as features of its devices and services. The question of whether a government can, through a secret order, require a company to maintain access to users' data in decrypted form goes to the reliability of those commitments in every market where such powers exist.
Government access to cloud data is not a UK-only story. In June 2025, Microsoft France's Anton Carniaux told a French Senate commission he could not guarantee French citizens' data would never be passed to US authorities without French authorisation. In the spring of 2026, the US Department of Justice served civil subpoenas on Apple and Google for data on users of a car app, part of requests covering more than 100,000 people, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed complaints with two state attorneys general after Google handed a doctoral student's data to ICE without notice.
Platforms themselves are moving in different directions on encryption. Meta switched off end-to-end encrypted chats on Instagram after May 8, 2026, while Ring announced in August 2026 that its TAKE encryption, under which it discards its copy of video keys, would become the default from September. In Europe, Signal threatened in October 2025 to leave Germany if the EU's Chat Control proposal passed, and a proxy vendor's data showed a 1,770% rise in SOCKS5 proxy usage since May 2022 as that vote approached.
The UK's own online rules have drawn similar reactions. When age checks under the Online Safety Act took effect on July 25, 2025, Proton VPN reported a more than 1,400% jump in UK sign-ups within hours, and the Wikimedia Foundation took the Act's categorisation rules to the High Court. Apple's cloud business also faces scrutiny on competition grounds: Italy's AGCM opened proceedings on June 9, 2026 over claims that Apple blocks full-device backups to iCloud rivals.
Privacy International, the lead claimant in the NGO case, has been active elsewhere in UK data policy this year. In September 2026 it asked the government to ban five uses of AI, including sentiment analysis and live biometric identification, and in October it intervened in the Court of Appeal in support of the Information Commissioner against Clearview AI.
There is also a procedural lesson in today's ruling that applies to any regulator or government body in litigation with a technology company. The tribunal treated off-the-record briefings as authorised departures from official policy, and treated the government's failure to produce evidence about them as telling. A stance maintained formally in court but abandoned informally in the press, on this reasoning, carries little weight.
What the judgment does not say
The OPEN judgment does not say what the notice requires Apple to do, which Apple products or services it concerns, or whether the order reported by the Financial Times as issued in September 2025 is the notice now under challenge. It does not explain the "change of circumstances" that ended Apple's first claim, and it sets no date for the substantive hearing. It does not name the Google chatbot product referred to. Apple stopped offering Advanced Data Protection, its optional end-to-end encryption setting for iCloud, to new UK users in February 2025; the judgment does not mention that setting. The PRIVATE and CLOSED reasoning remains unpublished.
Key facts
- Court: Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London WC2A 2LL
- Document: OPEN judgment, "OPEN Judgment Apple Inc. and Privacy Int. Ors", 24 pages
- Neutral citation: [2026] UKIPTrib 9
- Date of judgment: 19 November 2026
- Hearing date: 17 September 2026
- Case numbers: IPT/26/191/CH (Apple Inc v Secretary of State for the Home Department); IPT/25/83-86/CH (Privacy International, Liberty, Ian Hosein and Ben Wizner v Secretary of State for the Home Department)
- Panel: Lady Carmichael (President), Mr Justice Chamberlain, Mr Justice Johnson
- Counsel for Apple: Daniel Beard KC, Julian Milford KC, Gayatri Sarathy and Raphael Hogarth, instructed by Fieldfisher
- Counsel for the NGOs: Ben Jaffey KC, Celia Rooney and Abe Chauhan, instructed by Leigh Day
- Counsel for the Home Secretary: Neil Sheldon KC, Christopher Knight KC, Karl Laird and Hugo Murphy, instructed by the Government Legal Department
- Counsel to the Tribunal: Jason Beer KC and Paul Skinner
- Statutory power at issue: technical capability notice under section 253 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016
- Procedural rule: rule 7(1), Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules 2018
- Government witnesses: Lucy Montgomery-Pott, Head of the Investigatory Powers Unit (statement served for the April 2025 hearing, PRIVATE only); Andrew Scurry, Director of Technology, Data and Innovation, Homeland Security Group (OPEN and PRIVATE statements dated 11 September 2026)
- Earlier judgments: OPEN, PRIVATE and CLOSED judgments dated 7 April 2025
- Outcome: the Home Office's contention that confirming the notice would damage national security is rejected; disclosure of the notice's content left for later
- Next step: substantive hearing expected in the first half of 2027, according to the parties' indication
Timeline
- 2016: Investigatory Powers Act 2016 creates the power to give a relevant operator a technical capability notice under section 253
- 2018: Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules 2018 take effect, including rule 7
- Early 2025: Apple brings its first claim against the Home Secretary; the Home Office argues the claim's existence must be kept secret
- February 2025: Apple stops offering Advanced Data Protection to new UK users
- Before April 2025: The Times reports that the Home Office issued an order requiring Apple to provide access to encrypted material, "confirmed by Home Office sources"
- 7 April 2025: The tribunal's OPEN, PRIVATE and CLOSED judgments make public the parties and subject matter of Apple's claim
- Shortly after April 2025: Privacy International, Liberty, Ian Hosein and Ben Wizner file their claim, later listed for December 2026
- June 10, 2025: Microsoft France tells a French Senate commission it cannot guarantee French data will not reach US authorities
- 20 July 2025: Financial Times reports that the UK government is "seeking a way out" of the clash with the US administration
- July 25, 2025: Online Safety Act age checks take effect and Proton VPN reports a 1,400% jump in UK sign-ups
- 19 August 2025: Tulsi Gabbard posts on X that the UK "agreed to drop its mandate"; the Financial Times reports the same day
- September 2025: Order issued, according to the Financial Times sub-headline quoted in the judgment
- 1 October 2025: Financial Times reports "UK makes new attempt to access Apple cloud data"
- October 3, 2025: Signal says it would leave Germany if Chat Control passes
- April 14, 2026: EFF files complaints over Google's handover of a user's data to ICE
- May 8, 2026: End-to-end encryption for Instagram direct messages stops working
- May 2026: DOJ subpoenas to Apple and Google for data on more than 100,000 car app users are reported
- June 9, 2026: Italy's AGCM opens proceedings against Apple over iCloud backup interoperability
- Before July 2026 (date not stated): Apple's first claim is dismissed "because of a change of circumstances"
- July 2026: Apple brings its second claim, IPT/26/191/CH
- August 26, 2026: Ring announces TAKE encryption will become its default from September
- 11 September 2026: Andrew Scurry signs OPEN and PRIVATE witness statements for the Home Office
- Shortly before 17 September 2026: Senator Ron Wyden and Congressman Warren Davidson write to the tribunal; The Guardian publishes the letter
- 17 September 2026: Hearing in OPEN, PRIVATE and CLOSED sessions
- September 25, 2026: Privacy International publishes its call for a UK ban on five AI uses
- October 19-21, 2026: Court of Appeal hears Clearview AI's appeal, with Privacy International intervening
- 19 November 2026: The tribunal hands down its OPEN, PRIVATE and CLOSED judgments, [2026] UKIPTrib 9
- December 2026: Original date for the NGOs' substantive hearing, now agreed to be impractical
- First half of 2027: Expected substantive hearing of both claims
Related PPC Land coverage
- Microsoft can't protect French data from US government access - Microsoft France's testimony in June 2025 that it could not guarantee French data would never reach US authorities.
- DOJ demands Apple, Google and Amazon unmask 100,000+ car app users - US civil subpoenas to app stores and retailers for data on buyers and users of EZ Lynk products.
- EFF files deceptive trade complaint against Google over ICE data handover - Complaints filed in California and New York after Google gave a doctoral student's data to immigration authorities without notice.
- Instagram is killing its end-to-end encrypted chats - here's what changes May 8 - Meta's withdrawal of end-to-end encryption from Instagram direct messages.
- Ring drops its copy of video keys as TAKE becomes default in September - Ring's move to a default encryption model that deletes its copy of video keys.
- Signal threatens to exit Germany over Chat Control vote - Signal's October 2025 warning over the EU's message-scanning proposal.
- EU Chat Control vote triggers 1,770% surge in proxy usage - Proxy vendor data on usage growth across EU countries ahead of the Chat Control vote.
- UK online safety law sparks massive VPN surge - VPN sign-ups after age verification rules took effect under the Online Safety Act.
- Wikipedia challenges UK Online Safety Act categorization rules - The Wikimedia Foundation's High Court challenge to the Act's Category 1 thresholds.
- Italy's AGCM probes Apple over blocked iCloud rivals on iOS, iPadOS - Italian proceedings under the DMA over full-device backups to non-iCloud providers.
- Privacy International asks UK to ban 5 AI uses, including sentiment analysis - Privacy International's response to a UK call for evidence on data regulation and AI.
- Clearview AI faces Court of Appeal test of 7.5m pound UK fine - The Court of Appeal hearing in which Privacy International intervened in support of the Information Commissioner.
Summary
Who: The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (Lady Carmichael, Mr Justice Chamberlain and Mr Justice Johnson), ruling on claims by Apple Inc and by Privacy International, Liberty, Ian Hosein and Ben Wizner against the Secretary of State for the Home Department.
What: The tribunal rejected the Home Office's argument that confirming it had given Apple a technical capability notice under section 253 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 would damage national security. It found that officials had made authorised briefings to The Times and the Financial Times and that the government had let Apple brief senior US officials without assurances of confidentiality. Most of Apple's five grounds of challenge can now be heard in public, while the notice's content stays secret pending further argument.
When: The OPEN judgment, [2026] UKIPTrib 9, was handed down today, 19 November 2026, after a hearing on 17 September 2026. The substantive hearing is expected in the first half of 2027.
Where: The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice in London, with consequences for Apple's users and for any technology company that receives such a notice.
Why: The government's neither confirm nor deny policy only protects national security if it is applied consistently, and the tribunal found that the government's own authorised briefings had broken it. Because "anyone with even a passing interest in this topic already knows" about the notice, the judges gave the Home Office's assessment no significant weight and held that open justice required the fact to be stated in public.
Discussion