Ten organizations of musicians, songwriters, performers, artist managers and fans filed amicus briefs in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on November 13, 2026, asking Judge Carl J. Nichols to let Washington, D.C.'s new cap on ticket resale prices take effect. The briefs, both titled "Brief of Artist and Fan Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant," were filed in two parallel lawsuits against the District: one brought by Ticket Policy Forum, Inc. together with SeatGeek, Vivid Seats, Gametime and TickPick, the other by the National Association of Ticketing Professionals and two broker members, ASC Ticket Company and Stage Front Tickets, Inc.
The coalition includes the Recording Academy, SAG-AFTRA and the American Federation of Musicians. Both sets of plaintiffs want a preliminary injunction blocking the Restricting Egregious Scalping Against Live Entertainment (RESALE) Amendment Act of 2026 before it begins to apply on January 1, 2027. The law limits resale prices to the initial ticket price plus 10%, caps secondary exchange fees at 10% of that initial price and requires the original price to be disclosed. Judge Nichols granted leave to file the briefs on November 16. Three days later, on November 19, he heard oral argument on both injunction motions and took them under advisement, according to minute entries on the two dockets. No ruling had been entered at the time of writing.
In Short
Ten music industry and fan groups have asked a federal judge in Washington to reject attempts by ticket resale companies and brokers to block a District of Columbia law that caps resale prices at 10% above the original ticket price. The fight affects the online ticket exchanges, including SeatGeek and Vivid Seats, and the professional brokers who sell through them, along with fans buying tickets to concerts and shows in the District. The judge heard arguments on November 19 but has not decided whether the law can start on January 1, 2027, so the caps, fee limits and price disclosure rules remain in limbo for now.
Two lawsuits, one judge
The two cases were filed two days apart in October and are both assigned to Judge Nichols. They attack the same statute from slightly different positions in the market. The Ticket Policy Forum case represents the exchanges, the marketplaces where tickets change hands. The National Association of Ticketing Professionals case represents the brokers, the professional sellers who list inventory on those marketplaces. According to the amicus brief in the brokers' case, the association was formerly called the National Association of Ticket Brokers.
| Ticket Policy Forum v. District of Columbia | National Association of Ticketing Professionals v. District of Columbia | |
|---|---|---|
| Case number | 1:26-cv-03577 (CJN) | 1:26-cv-03620 (CJN) |
| Complaint filed | October 14, 2026 | October 16, 2026 |
| Plaintiffs | Ticket Policy Forum, Inc.; SeatGeek, Inc.; Vivid Seats LLC; Gametime United, Inc.; TickPick, LLC | National Association of Ticketing Professionals; ASC Ticket Company; Stage Front Tickets, Inc. |
| Plaintiff type | Secondary ticket exchanges and their trade association | Ticket brokers and their trade association |
| Preliminary injunction motion | ECF No. 10, October 14, 2026 | ECF No. 9, October 16, 2026 |
| District's opposition | ECF No. 24, November 9, 2026 | ECF No. 17, November 9, 2026 |
| Amicus brief | ECF No. 26-1, 34 pages, November 13, 2026 | ECF No. 19-1, 33 pages, November 13, 2026 |
| Leave to file granted | November 16, 2026 | November 16, 2026 |
| Plaintiffs' reply | ECF No. 27, November 16, 2026 | ECF No. 20, November 16, 2026 |
| Hearing | November 19, 2026; motion under advisement | November 19, 2026; motion under advisement |
Source: the two amicus briefs and the court dockets.
According to the coalition's statement distributed on November 18, the plaintiffs bring Commerce Clause, due process and equal protection challenges. The exchanges' own motion adds a First Amendment claim against the original-price disclosure requirement, and it asks for a ruling by December 10 so that the companies can seek appellate review if needed and make compliance decisions before January.
What the RESALE Act requires
The briefs describe the statute through its codified sections. The D.C. Council's stated purpose, quoted from the preamble in both briefs, was to "protect artists, venues, and consumers ... from unfair and deceptive practices in live event ticket purchases." According to the coalition's statement, the Council passed the law unanimously.
| Provision | D.C. Code section | Rule as described in the briefs |
|---|---|---|
| Resale price cap | § 28-5506(b) | A ticket can be resold for up to 10% above the initial ticket price |
| Exchange fee cap | § 28-5506(c) | Secondary ticket exchanges can collect fees of up to 10% of the initial ticket price |
| Original price disclosure | § 28-5506(a)(2) | The original price paid for the ticket must be disclosed |
| Definition of a secondary ticket exchange | § 28-5501(4) | "electronic marketplace[s] that enable[] a person to sell, purchase, and resell tickets" |
| Bots and speculative listings | Not cited by section | Banned, according to the briefs' introductions |
| Later adjustment | § 28-5507(b)-(c) | Beginning January 1, 2028, the Mayor can adjust the caps upward or downward through rulemaking |
| Publication | 73 D.C. Reg. 11,351 | Published August 14, 2026 |
The brokers' motion, filed on the public docket, adds detail the briefs do not repeat. It says the law exempts movie screenings and sporting events organized by teams or associations located in the District, treats violations as Class 2 civil infractions carrying fines of $1,000 to $8,000 per offense, and classifies them as unlawful trade practices open to enforcement by the Department of Licensing and Consumer Protection, the D.C. Attorney General and consumers.
How the caps would apply to a resale
Pieced together from the two briefs and the brokers' motion, the statute sets out the following path for a ticket to a covered event once the law applies:
- A fan or broker buys a ticket at its initial price from a venue or primary ticketer. The cap is measured against the total price of that initial ticket, according to the brokers' motion.
- When the ticket is listed for resale, the original price paid has to be disclosed, under § 28-5506(a)(2).
- The resale price cannot exceed the initial ticket price plus 10%, under § 28-5506(b).
- The secondary exchange handling the sale cannot charge fees above 10% of the initial ticket price, under § 28-5506(c).
- Selling below the original price remains unrestricted. According to the brokers' brief, the cap "caps resale above the original price, not below it."
- From January 1, 2028, the Mayor can raise or lower the caps by rulemaking, under § 28-5507.
On a ticket originally priced at $65.80, the figure the briefs cite for a sold-out show at the Black Cat club, those rules would put the ceiling at $72.38 for the resale price and $6.58 for the exchange's fees (PPC Land calculation). Resale listings for that show, according to the briefs, ranged from $156 to $1,047.02 on Ticketmaster, SeatGeek and StubHub. The top listing works out to a markup of roughly 1,491% (PPC Land calculation); the briefs describe it as "nearly sixteen times face value."
Who filed and what they say
The ten amici, as listed in the corporate disclosure statements, are a mix of labor unions, trade groups and nonprofits:
| Organization | Type, as disclosed in the briefs | Details from the briefs |
|---|---|---|
| American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada (AFM) | 501(c)(5) labor organization | Founded 1896; describes itself as the largest union of professional musicians in the world |
| Artist Rights Alliance (ARA) | 501(c)(4) nonprofit | Founded 2014 by artists including Rosanne Cash and John McCrea |
| Common Good, Inc. d/b/a Fan Alliance | 501(c)(3) nonprofit | Says it accepts no funding from industry sources |
| Future of Music Coalition (FMC) | Nonprofit, non-stock corporation | 25 years of research and advocacy |
| Music Artists Coalition (MAC) | 501(c)(6) nonprofit | Founded 2019 by artists and managers |
| Music Managers Forum-US (MMF-US) | 501(c)(6) organization | Founded 1993 |
| National Academy of Recording Arts & Sciences (Recording Academy) | 501(c)(6) nonprofit | Consulted by the GAO for its 2018 ticketing report |
| National Independent Talent Organization (NITO) | 501(c)(6) trade association | Formed 2020; members book tens of thousands of concerts a year |
| SAG-AFTRA | 501(c)(5) labor union | About 160,000 members |
| Songwriters of North America (SONA) | 501(c)(6) nonprofit | Formed 2015 |
All ten are advocates for the law, and several testified for it before the Council's Committee on Public Works and Operations, according to the briefs. Katherine Van Dyck of KVD Strategies PLLC wrote and filed both briefs. Her certification of counsel states that no party or party's counsel wrote any part of them or paid for their preparation.
The coalition's statement carried quotes from leaders of eight member organizations. "The RESALE Act is the gold standard for event ticketing policy," said Tino Gaglardi, President of the American Federation of Musicians. Todd Dupler, Chief Advocacy & Public Policy Officer at the Recording Academy, said: "Music fans shouldn't have to compete with bots and speculators to see their favorite artists, and artists shouldn't watch their fans get priced out." Kevin Erickson, Director of Future of Music Coalition, said the brokers and resale platforms challenging the law "profit when tickets meant for fans are bought up in bulk and resold at massive markups." Nathaniel Marro, Executive Director of the National Independent Talent Organization, called the lawsuit "a last-ditch effort to stop progress for fans and artists across the country and before common sense ticket reforms hit the halls of Congress."
Van Dyck framed the law as an old idea rather than a new one. "Laws regulating and capping ticket resale and speculation have existed for over a century, and judges, including the Supreme Court in 1965, have rejected nearly every constitutional challenge they have faced," she said.
The central claim: brokers, not fans
Both briefs open their argument the same way. The plaintiffs describe the fan who falls ill or cannot attend and needs a safe way to sell a ticket. The coalition argues that this fan is not the plaintiffs' principal customer. "Plaintiffs are not fans. They are professional ticket brokers," the brief in the brokers' case says, describing businesses "that buy tickets, often months before an event, and resell them at a markup."
The numbers behind that claim come from government reports, an industry blog and the coalition's own research:
| Claim | Figure | Source cited in the briefs |
|---|---|---|
| Share of exchange tickets listed by brokers | 70-80% | TickPick founder's 2019 blog post; Vanderbilt Policy Accelerator (Aug. 2026) |
| Brokers buying more than $3 million each from Ticketmaster, 2013-2015, New York area, American Express purchases only | 12 brokers | New York Attorney General, "Obstructed View" (2016) |
| Average markup, six brokers studied | 49% (range 15% to 118%) | New York Attorney General (2016) |
| Average secondary market markup | 74% | GAO-18-347 (2018) |
| Average markup on white-label resale sites | About 180% | GAO-18-347 (2018) |
| Average markup across 65 shows | 91% | NITO survey, via Vanderbilt Policy Accelerator |
| Single stadium show by a country artist | 7,767 tickets resold at a 313% markup, grossing resellers $2.3 million | Council testimony of Randy Nichols (NITO) |
| Some New York resales after deregulation | Above 1,000% of face value | New York Attorney General (2016) |
The white-label figure comes from a GAO comparison between those sites and other resale sites, according to the briefs. The coalition also quotes the Council committee's own report, which said fans who pay inflated resale prices "subsidize a reseller who provided no value to the artist, the venue, or the event."
From there the briefs build a chain of argument. Artists often price tickets below what the market would bear, for reasons the GAO listed in 2018: to avoid being "perceived as gouging fans," to sell out shows, and to draw "the most enthusiastic fans ... rather than just those able to pay the most." The committee report, as quoted in the briefs, called "this gap between face value and market value" what "creates the scalping opportunity." Uncapped resale, in the coalition's account, lets brokers capture that discount through arbitrage between the artist's price and the market-clearing price.
The coalition makes the same point about bots. New York banned ticket bots in 2010, according to the briefs, yet six years later its Attorney General found that bot use had "reached epidemic proportions in the ticketing industry." The briefs argue that bans alone did not work because "the profits bots generate are simply too high," and that caps remove the incentive.
The exchanges' fees, and the sealed numbers
The brief in the Ticket Policy Forum case contains a section absent from the brokers' version, aimed squarely at how SeatGeek, Vivid Seats, Gametime and TickPick earn money. The exchanges charge fees calculated on the resale price. According to the brief, the companies' own declarations state that their ordinary rates will exceed 10% of the initial price and violate the cap without any change in the platforms' pricing.
The GAO, the brief says, found that most secondary exchanges set their buyer fee as a percentage of the ticket's list price, averaging 31% and reaching as high as 56%, and that most also charged sellers a second fee, "typically 10 percent of the ticket's sale price." Exchanges also charge download and delivery fees for electronic tickets, according to the brief, while primary sellers such as Ticketmaster charge for delivery only by mail or courier. Vivid Seats sets fees based on factors including "the time remaining until the event," "seller economics," and "partner economics," the brief says, citing the company's declaration. SeatGeek operates in both the primary and secondary markets, allowing it, the coalition argues, to collect fees on multiple transactions involving a single ticket. Exchange fees make up roughly a fifth of all spending in the $18 billion secondary market, according to the Vanderbilt Policy Accelerator figure the brief cites.
"This is a business model that rewards markups," the brief says. "The higher the markups, the more Plaintiffs earn, on both sides of the sale, with no change in the service Plaintiffs provide or the costs Plaintiffs incur."
What the coalition cannot see is the exchanges' actual take rate. The plaintiffs filed their declarations with cost and fee figures redacted, and Judge Nichols granted their motion to seal on October 19. In a footnote, the coalition asks the court to reconsider. "Because the motion to seal these records is also under seal, it is impossible for Amici to respond to Plaintiffs' sealing arguments in any meaningful way," the brief says, citing the "strong presumption of public access" to judicial records in the D.C. Circuit.
The brief also takes on the exchanges' argument that the original price is often unknowable. According to the coalition, Gametime receives a face-value figure through sellers' inventory feeds for a share of its District sales, SeatGeek has the original price in its own records whenever it was the primary ticketer, and both Vivid Seats and Gametime already require sellers to supply a ticket's face value where a jurisdiction's law requires it. A declaration filed by Van Dyck adds screenshots showing that Vivid Seats displays a separate fee line item at checkout for Maryland concerts but only an all-in price for California and D.C. concerts, which the coalition offers as evidence that the exchanges already tailor their sites to local law.
The Ticketmaster argument
The plaintiffs' motions lean on a passage from the Council committee's report: capping only the secondary market risked further consolidating monopoly power in the primary market, where Ticketmaster dominates. The coalition answers with the record from the federal antitrust case against Live Nation.
According to the briefs, a jury in United States v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. No. 24-cv-3973) found on April 15, 2026 that "Ticketmaster willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power" in the market for primary ticketing services to major concert venues. The states' evidence, as summarized in the briefs, put Ticketmaster's share of that market "well over 80%" since 2017, with exclusive contracts covering 65% to 71% of major concert venues. The jury found overcharges of $1.72 per ticket. The trial court had granted summary judgment to Live Nation on a separate claim covering a market for ticketing services sold directly to fans, reasoning that competition happens upstream, between venues and ticketers.
From that reasoning the coalition draws its conclusion. By the time a broker resells a ticket, the venue has already picked its primary ticketer and the original buyer has already paid that ticketer's fees. "Clearly, brokers are not competitors who discipline Ticketmaster. They are its customers, both as buyers and as sellers," the brokers' brief says, noting that plaintiff ASC resells tickets through Ticketmaster's own resale marketplace. Both briefs put it more sharply: "uncapped resale does not constrain Ticketmaster's monopoly power. It feeds it."
A footnote in both briefs cites the Federal Trade Commission's September 18, 2025 complaint against Live Nation (C.D. Cal. No. 2:25-cv-08884), which alleges that when Ticketmaster resells a ticket it originally sold, it collects three sets of fees on the same ticket:
| Fee layer, as alleged by the FTC | Range |
|---|---|
| Fees on the original purchase | 24% to 44% of the total price |
| Listing fee charged to the reseller | 13-15% of the resale price for consumers; 5-8% for brokers |
| Fee charged to the resale buyer | 17-23% of the resale price |
The FTC figures are allegations in a pending complaint, not findings.
Caps elsewhere, and the fraud dispute
The plaintiffs predict that the caps will force them to sell at a loss, drive them out of the District, push fans toward riskier channels and increase fraud. The coalition calls those predictions speculative and points to jurisdictions where caps operate.
In the United States, Maine caps resale marketplace fees at 10% of the original price and Vermont caps resale prices at 110% of the original price for events at certain independent venues, according to the briefs. The Ticket Policy Forum brief says the plaintiffs continue to offer tickets to events in both states. A 110% cap is pending in Massachusetts, and similar bills were introduced in 2026 in California, Delaware and Maryland. Abroad, the briefs list Ireland, France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Japan, Brazil, Hong Kong, Poland and Portugal as countries that prohibit resale above face value, with Ontario adopting a similar ban in 2026.
The most detailed evidence comes from Australia, through Council testimony by Jason Webb of the exchange Tixel. According to the briefs, Tixel voluntarily capped "hundreds of thousands of tickets at no more than face value plus 10 percent" across thousands of events in the last year, with "near zero" reported fraud. It sold more than 4,000 tickets within Australia's mandated cap to sold-out Coldplay shows in 2024. When StubHub's parent company, which operates as Viagogo in Australia, stepped aside from three Oasis concerts in Melbourne because of Victoria's cap, a capped exchange helped more than 5,000 fans attend instead. Tixel's fraud systems blocked more than 25,000 fraudulent listings in a year. A survey of more than 3,500 Australian consumers found that tickets are typically resold "due to ordinary life changes such as schedule conflicts or illness, not profit motives."
On fraud, the coalition attacks the plaintiffs' main study, by Bradshaw Advisory. According to the briefs, the study was "commissioned by StubHub International," and its authors "could not establish any causal relationship between price caps and fraud rates." The briefs also cite reported fraud shares on social media of 27% in the United Kingdom, 27% in Ireland and 30% in Victoria, and note that during the Australian leg of Taylor Swift's Eras Tour, Australia's consumer agency received 273 reports of falsely advertised tickets against total attendance above 600,000.
Deregulation, the briefs argue, failed on its own terms. When New York lifted its cap in 2007, the bill's sponsor predicted "greater competition for the resale dollar" could lower secondary prices. Nine years later, the state's Attorney General found that "competition-driven savings intended to benefit fans have instead been converted to profits for a handful of savvy middlemen." New Jersey's Division of Consumer Affairs reached a similar conclusion after an eighteen-month experiment with uncapped resale.
What the plaintiffs argue
The plaintiffs' case, set out in their motions on the public docket, rests on a different reading of the same legislative history. According to the brokers' motion, the Committee on Public Works and Operations struck the price and fee caps from its June 22, 2026 committee print, calling the evidence on resale caps "uncertain" and warning of risks to competition. Councilmembers Charles Allen and Christina Henderson restored the caps by amendment on June 30, and the Council passed the bill on July 14. The Mayor's office and the Department of Licensing and Consumer Protection had testified jointly against the caps, warning they could drive buyers to unregulated markets.
The plaintiffs also cite figures on consumer savings. The brokers' motion relies on data showing resellers sold below face value for 55% of analyzed events in 2023 and 62% in 2024, and on a Protect Ticket Rights estimate that D.C. fans saved more than $6.1 million on resale tickets in 2024. The coalition responds that the cap does not affect below-face sales at all, and, citing testimony from the Fix the Tix Coalition, that Protect Ticket Rights is funded by the National Association of Ticket Brokers, the brokers' association under its former name. The exchanges' motion argues that their service fees ordinarily exceed 10% of the seller's price by several percentage points to pay for services ranging from fraud protection to money-back guarantees, that "face value" is often unknowable when primary sellers use dynamic pricing, and that the disclosure mandate compels them to publish a price from a transaction they took no part in.
The coalition's reply on harm is blunt. Two of the brokers, ASC and Stage Front, said in their declarations that without the cap they would keep selling tickets at prices likely above the 110% limit. "A broker's lost markup is not a harm to the public and certainly not a harm to fans and artists," the brokers' brief says. "It is the public benefit the D.C. Council intended."
A history lesson in the filings
Both briefs spend several pages on history, and the legal point sits inside it. Charles Dickens complained during his 1867 American reading tour that "it is impossible to keep out speculators who immediately sell at a premium," as resale prices climbed from $5 to $50. In 1964, the New York Times reported Broadway insiders selling tickets at $100 each through a practice called "ice," netting $10 million a year. Bruce Springsteen's 1980 tour tickets went from $12.50 at the box office to as much as $200 on the street.
The legal anchor is Gold v. DiCarlo, a 1964 decision by a three-judge federal court in New York rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to New York's cap on resale markups. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed it in 1965. The coalition argues that the summary affirmance binds the D.C. court on the constitutional questions it decided, and accuses the plaintiffs of asking the court to "Lochner-ize regulation of the ticketing industry," a reference to the early 20th century era when courts struck down economic regulation. The briefs list eight state court decisions upholding resale caps against due process, equal protection, Commerce Clause and confiscation challenges, with one exception from Indiana in 1949.
Why the case matters beyond concert tickets
For the marketing industry, the D.C. litigation is the latest front in a broader effort by regulators to control how prices and fees appear to buyers online. The FTC's Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Fees, which took effect on May 12, 2025 and covers live-event tickets and short-term lodging, requires all-in pricing from ticket sellers; PPC Land described the rule in its report on the FTC's $35 million settlement with Hopper over hidden booking fees. StubHub agreed to a $10 million refund over deceptive ticket pricing announced on April 9, 2026. In the United Kingdom, StubHub and Viagogo were among eight firms the CMA investigated over online pricing practices, after a government review found drip pricing at 93% of the event-ticket businesses it examined.
The D.C. law goes further than disclosure. It sets a ceiling on price and on the intermediary's fee, and it forces a historic number, the original price, onto every resale listing. That is a direct constraint on how exchanges display and market their inventory, and the Vivid Seats checkout screenshots in the coalition's declaration show how much the presentation already varies by jurisdiction. Price controls on intermediaries are not unheard of in media markets either: PPC Land has reported on how Yellow Pages operated under UK price caps for 16 years, and on arguments that digital platforms could face similar treatment.
The bot question also has federal precedent. The FTC sued Key Investment Group in August 2025 under the BOTS Act, alleging the broker bought 379,776 tickets worth about $57 million, including 2,280 Eras Tour tickets, by bypassing Ticketmaster's purchase limits. And the plaintiffs' argument that face value is disappearing ties into the spread of algorithmic pricing on the primary side: SeatGeek's own promoter tool, PPC Land reported in October, prices each seat by its estimated value, with TourIQ selling 29% more tickets than projected at a 13% lower price at one stadium game, according to SeatGeek.
Courts have not been friendly to every industry attempt to stop state technology and commerce laws before they start. In March, a federal judge in California denied xAI's bid to block a state AI training data law, finding no likelihood of success on its takings, First Amendment and vagueness claims. Amicus filings by industry and advocacy groups, such as Digital Content Next's brief backing Amazon against Perplexity, have become a regular part of these fights. Whether Judge Nichols treats the RESALE Act as ordinary economic regulation, as the coalition urges, or as an out-of-bounds price control, as the plaintiffs argue, will decide whether the caps start in January.
The briefs do not disclose the exchanges' redacted fee and cost figures, give no data on the volume of resale transactions in the District, and do not resolve the plaintiffs' central vagueness question of whether the cap turns on the event's location, the buyer's residence or the seller's. Many of the market statistics are years old, including the 2016 New York report and the 2018 GAO study, and the Australian evidence comes from the testimony of Tixel, an exchange that operates under caps.
Key facts
- Law: Restricting Egregious Scalping Against Live Entertainment (RESALE) Amendment Act of 2026, 73 D.C. Reg. 11,351 (August 14, 2026); Council bill B26-0224
- Key sections: D.C. Code § 28-5501(4) (secondary ticket exchange definition); § 28-5506(a)(2) (original price disclosure); § 28-5506(b) (resale cap, initial price plus 10%); § 28-5506(c) (exchange fee cap, 10% of initial price); § 28-5507(b)-(c) (Mayor may adjust caps from January 1, 2028)
- Applies from: January 1, 2027, according to both plaintiffs' motions
- Court: U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Judge Carl J. Nichols
- Case 1: Ticket Policy Forum, Inc., et al. v. District of Columbia, No. 1:26-cv-03577 (CJN), filed October 14, 2026
- Case 2: National Association of Ticketing Professionals, et al. v. District of Columbia, No. 1:26-cv-03620 (CJN), filed October 16, 2026
- Source documents: "Brief of Artist and Fan Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant," ECF No. 26-1 in No. 1:26-cv-03577 (34 pages) and ECF No. 19-1 in No. 1:26-cv-03620 (33 pages), both dated and filed November 13, 2026
- Counsel for amici: Katherine Van Dyck, KVD Strategies PLLC, Washington, D.C.
- Amici: American Federation of Musicians; Artist Rights Alliance; Fan Alliance (Common Good, Inc.); Future of Music Coalition; Music Artists Coalition; Music Managers Forum-US; Recording Academy; National Independent Talent Organization; SAG-AFTRA; Songwriters of North America
- Status: Leave to file granted November 16, 2026; preliminary injunction motions argued November 19, 2026 and taken under advisement
- Dockets: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/74960095/ticket-policy-forum-inc-v-district-of-columbia/ and https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/74975991/national-association-of-ticketing-professionals-v-district-of-columbia/
Timeline
- 1867 - Charles Dickens complains of ticket speculators during his American reading tour, with resale prices rising from $5 to $50.
- 1964 - A three-judge federal court in Gold v. DiCarlo upholds New York's cap on resale markups; the Supreme Court summarily affirms in 1965.
- 2007 - New York lifts its resale price cap.
- 2010 - New York bans ticket bots.
- 2016 - The New York Attorney General's "Obstructed View" report finds some resales above 1,000% of face value.
- 2018 - The GAO publishes report GAO-18-347 on event ticket sales, finding an average secondary market markup of 74%.
- April 9, 2025 - Councilmember Charles Allen introduces bill B26-0224, the future RESALE Act.
- May 12, 2025 - The FTC Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Fees takes effect for live-event tickets and short-term lodging.
- August 18, 2025 - The FTC sues broker Key Investment Group under the BOTS Act over 379,776 tickets.
- September 18, 2025 - The FTC sues Live Nation in the Central District of California, alleging three layers of Ticketmaster fees on resold tickets.
- October 22, 2025 - The Committee on Public Works and Operations holds its public hearing on the bill.
- November 18, 2025 - The UK CMA opens pricing investigations into eight firms, including StubHub and Viagogo.
- February 27, 2026 - The court in United States v. Live Nation denies reconsideration of its summary judgment ruling.
- April 9, 2026 - StubHub's $10 million refund over deceptive ticket pricing is announced.
- April 15, 2026 - A jury finds Ticketmaster willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power in primary ticketing for major concert venues, with overcharges of $1.72 per ticket.
- June 22, 2026 - The committee report and committee print strike the price and fee caps.
- June 30, 2026 - Councilmembers Allen and Henderson restore the caps by amendment.
- July 14, 2026 - The D.C. Council passes the bill.
- August 14, 2026 - The RESALE Act is published at 73 D.C. Reg. 11,351.
- Late September 2026 - The Act becomes law after the congressional review period, according to the brokers' motion.
- October 14, 2026 - Ticket Policy Forum, SeatGeek, Vivid Seats, Gametime and TickPick sue and move for a preliminary injunction.
- October 16, 2026 - The National Association of Ticketing Professionals, ASC Ticket Company and Stage Front Tickets sue and move for a preliminary injunction.
- October 19, 2026 - Judge Nichols grants the exchanges' motion to seal portions of their declarations.
- November 9, 2026 - The District files its oppositions.
- November 13, 2026 - Ten artist and fan organizations file amicus briefs in both cases.
- November 16, 2026 - The court grants leave to file the briefs; the plaintiffs file their replies.
- November 18, 2026 - The coalition distributes a statement on the briefs.
- November 19, 2026 - Judge Nichols hears argument on both motions and takes them under advisement.
- December 10, 2026 - Date by which the exchanges asked for a ruling.
- January 1, 2027 - The RESALE Act is scheduled to begin applying.
- January 1, 2028 - The Mayor's authority to adjust the caps by rulemaking begins.
Related PPC Land coverage
- FTC sues ticket brokers who bought 2,280 Taylor Swift tickets illegally - The August 2025 BOTS Act case against Key Investment Group over 379,776 tickets bought by evading Ticketmaster's limits.
- CMA opens investigations into eight firms over online pricing practices - The UK competition regulator's probe of StubHub, Viagogo and six other firms, with drip pricing found at 93% of event-ticket businesses reviewed.
- Court denies xAI's bid to block California AI training data law - A federal judge refused a preliminary injunction against a state law in March 2026, finding no likely success on the merits.
- Why major publishers are backing Amazon against Perplexity's AI spoofing - Digital Content Next's April 2026 amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit.
- FTC fines Hopper 35 million dollars over hidden booking fees - The July 2026 settlement and the FTC fees rule covering live-event tickets since May 12, 2025.
- Yellow Pages faced 16 years of price caps. Whittaker says platforms are next - How UK regulators capped directory advertising prices from 1997 to 2013, and the case for applying caps to platforms.
- Retailers face FTC enforcement over undisclosed personalized pricing - The FTC's August 2026 proposed policy statement, which cites StubHub's $10 million refund over deceptive ticket pricing.
- SeatGeek's TourIQ sold 29% more tickets than projected at a 13% lower price - SeatGeek's seat-level pricing tool for promoters and venues, built on primary and resale transaction data.
Summary
Who: Ten artist, union and fan organizations, including the Recording Academy, SAG-AFTRA and the American Federation of Musicians, represented by Katherine Van Dyck of KVD Strategies PLLC, filed against two sets of plaintiffs: ticket exchanges SeatGeek, Vivid Seats, Gametime and TickPick with their trade group Ticket Policy Forum, and the National Association of Ticketing Professionals with brokers ASC Ticket Company and Stage Front Tickets. The defendant is the District of Columbia; Judge Carl J. Nichols presides.
What: Amicus briefs supporting the District against motions for a preliminary injunction that would block the RESALE Act, a law capping ticket resale prices at the initial price plus 10%, capping exchange fees at 10% of the initial price, banning bots and speculative listings, and requiring disclosure of the original price.
When: The briefs were filed on November 13, 2026, accepted on November 16 and followed by oral argument on November 19, when the judge took the motions under advisement. The law is set to apply from January 1, 2027.
Where: The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in cases 1:26-cv-03577 and 1:26-cv-03620, over a law covering live event tickets in Washington, D.C.
Why: The coalition argues that resale exchanges serve professional brokers rather than fans, that uncapped resale feeds Ticketmaster's market power instead of checking it, and that caps already work in Maine, Vermont and Australia. The plaintiffs argue the law is vague, reaches beyond the District, compels speech and will push fans toward riskier markets. The outcome will set whether one U.S. jurisdiction can cap both resale prices and the intermediary's fee on the same ticket.
Discussion