Google terminates over 18,500 channels in Q3 2025 influence operations

Google's Threat Analysis Group terminated 18,532 YouTube channels during the third quarter of 2025 as part of investigations into coordinated influence operations spanning nine countries, according to a bulletin published November 13, 2025.

The enforcement actions documented in the TAG Bulletin: Q3 2025 represent the latest phase in ongoing efforts to disrupt coordinated inauthentic behavior across Google platforms. Russia accounted for the majority of terminated channels, with Chinese operations representing the second-largest volume of enforcement actions during the July through September period.

During July, TAG terminated 3,286 YouTube channels linked to Russia, with the largest single action removing 382 channels connected to a Russian consulting firm. These operations shared content in Russian supporting Russia while criticizing Ukraine and Western institutions. The consulting firm pattern continued throughout the quarter, with TAG identifying multiple campaigns linked to commercial entities providing coordinated influence services.

Chinese-linked operations resulted in the termination of 11,506 YouTube channels across the three-month period. TAG removed 2,497 channels in July, 2,533 in August, and 6,484 in September as part of ongoing investigations into coordinated inauthentic networks linked to the People's Republic of China. According to the bulletin, these networks "uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and US foreign affairs," with findings remaining "consistent with our previous reports."

The scale of Chinese operations documented in Q3 2025 substantially exceeds enforcement patterns from earlier quarters. Previous TAG reporting from Q2 2025 showed Chinese-linked terminations totaling 1,545 channels in a single month, indicating potential expansion of coordinated influence activities targeting US-China relations content.

Moldova emerged as a significant geographic focus across multiple Russian-linked campaigns. TAG terminated 742 YouTube channels in August and September sharing content in Romanian and Russian that criticized the Moldovan government. The bulletin documents eight separate enforcement actions targeting Moldova-related content, including operations that also criticized NATO and the European Union.

Operations linked to Russia incorporated multilingual content strategies. TAG terminated channels distributing material in Romanian, Polish, French, German, Armenian, Farsi, Ukrainian, Spanish, Uzbek, Serbian, English, Kyrgyz, and Portuguese. This linguistic diversity indicates sophisticated targeting approaches designed to reach multiple regional audiences across Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America.

Azerbaijan-linked operations resulted in 1,371 channel terminations across the quarter. TAG identified three separate campaigns sharing content in Azerbaijani that supported Azerbaijan while criticizing Armenia and critics of the Azerbaijani government. The August and September enforcement actions represented the largest single-country terminations outside Russia and China.

Turkey-related operations led to 656 YouTube channel terminations. TAG documented campaigns supporting the Turkish government, with one operation in July sharing content supportive of Iran while criticizing Israel. The bulletin identified multiple distinct Turkish campaigns operating throughout the quarter.

Indonesia emerged in September enforcement actions, with TAG terminating 489 YouTube channels across three separate operations. The campaigns shared content in Bahasa Indonesian supporting the Indonesian government and political figures, while one operation targeted the West Java government with critical content.

Iranian operations resulted in 138 YouTube channel terminations across the quarter. TAG identified campaigns sharing content in Arabic, Persian, Hindi, and English that supported the Iranian government and Palestine while criticizing the United States and Israel. The bulletin documents blocking of domains from Google News surfaces and Discover alongside channel terminations.

Domain blocking represented a secondary enforcement mechanism documented throughout the bulletin. TAG blocked 109 domains from appearing in Google News and Discover surfaces during Q3 2025. Russia accounted for 32 blocked domains, Romania for 66 domains, and smaller numbers attributed to Iran, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Albania, and the United Kingdom.

The Romanian domain blocking represented the largest single action, with TAG preventing 66 domains from appearing in Google News and Discover surfaces as part of investigations into coordinated influence operations sharing content critical of the Moldovan government, local political parties, and the EU.

UK-linked operations appeared for the first time in TAG bulletins during August, with enforcement actions blocking eight domains from Google News and Discover. According to the bulletin, the campaign shared content in English and Italian "targeting individuals," though specific details about the operation's focus remained limited in public documentation.

Google Ads account terminations occurred in smaller volumes compared to YouTube channel removals. TAG terminated 12 Ads accounts across the quarter, with operations linked to Russia, Turkey, and Albania. The bulletin documents one Blogger blog termination connected to Albanian operations sharing content in Persian critical of the Iranian government.

September marked the quarter's most intensive enforcement period, with TAG terminating 10,882 YouTube channels compared to 3,831 in July and 3,819 in August. The September surge reflected primarily Chinese-linked terminations totaling 6,484 channels alongside a Russian consulting firm operation involving 3,269 channels.

The Russian consulting firm pattern represented a recurring enforcement theme. TAG specifically identified three separate operations throughout the quarter linked to "a Russian consulting frm," suggesting commercial entities providing coordinated influence services to state or political actors. This commercialization model complicates enforcement by blurring distinctions between legitimate marketing services and coordinated manipulation.

Philippines-linked operations resulted in 183 channel terminations in July, sharing content in Tagalog supportive of the government. Poland-linked operations led to 12 channel terminations in July for content supporting Russia while criticizing Moldova and Ukraine governments.

Cambodia-related enforcement actions in September terminated 66 YouTube channels sharing content in Khmer and English supportive of Cambodia while critical of Thailand. Chile-linked operations resulted in 63 channel terminations for content in Spanish supporting a Chilean political party.

Ukraine-linked operations appeared in September enforcement actions, with TAG terminating five YouTube channels and blocking three domains sharing content in English and Russian that supported Russia while criticizing Ukraine. Moldova-linked operations in September led to eight channel terminations and one domain block for content supporting the Moldovan government and Russia while criticizing Ukraine and the West.

The multilingual and multi-platform nature of documented operations highlights coordination across language barriers and content distribution channels. TAG enforcement actions addressed content in over 15 languages spanning Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

For digital marketing professionals, these enforcement patterns demonstrate platform integrity challenges extending beyond traditional advertising fraud. Coordinated influence operations incorporating monetization components create difficulties distinguishing between authentic commercial activity and manipulative behavior designed to generate revenue while spreading influence.

Platform policy violations can cascade through account relationships, affecting compliant advertisers connected to non-compliant management structures. The scale of TAG enforcement actions suggests ongoing challenges maintaining content authenticity across advertising platforms where inventory quality remains paramount for advertiser value.

The involvement of consulting firms in multiple Russian operations indicates potential commercialization of influence activities. This business model complicates enforcement as it creates ambiguity between legitimate marketing services and coordinated manipulation, similar to challenges platforms face distinguishing authentic content from coordinated inauthentic behavior.

Content moderation systems combining automation and human review process hundreds of hours of video uploads per minute, creating scaling challenges for policy enforcement. TAG's quarterly bulletins provide transparency about coordinated influence operations while documenting platform integrity efforts.

The bulletin represents TAG's continued commitment to disrupting coordinated inauthentic behavior designed to influence public opinion on geopolitical conflicts, domestic politics, and international relations. The detailed country-specific breakdowns indicate comprehensive approaches to addressing persistent challenges in digital content environments.

Previous TAG reporting patterns show sustained increases in coordinated influence operations over multiple quarters, with Q3 2024 documenting over 13,000 channel terminations. The Q3 2025 bulletin's 18,532 channel removals represents a 42% increase compared to the same period in 2024, indicating expanding scope of coordinated influence activities.

The geographic distribution of enforcement actions reflects geopolitical tensions, with substantial focus on Ukraine-Russia conflict narratives, Moldova's political environment ahead of elections, Azerbaijan-Armenia tensions, and US-China relations. Content themes consistently supported state positions while criticizing opposing governments and Western institutions.

Marketing professionals operating across international markets should recognize how coordinated influence operations affect advertising environments and platform trust. Brand safety considerations extend beyond traditional content adjacency concerns to include association risks with coordinated inauthentic behavior that platforms actively remove.

The quarterly bulletin format enables ongoing tracking of enforcement trends across time periods and geographic regions. TAG published related bulletins covering Q2 2025 and Q1 2025, establishing consistent reporting frameworks for documenting coordinated influence operation disruptions across Google platforms.

Timeline

• July 2025: TAG terminates 3,831 YouTube channels, blocks 28 domains from Google News and Discover, removes 12 Ads accounts and 1 Blogger blog across operations linked to Russia, China, Turkey, Philippines, Azerbaijan, and Poland
• August 2025: TAG terminates 3,819 YouTube channels, blocks 38 domains, removes 8 Ads accounts and 1 Blogger blog across operations linked to Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, UK, Albania, and Azerbaijan
• September 2025: TAG terminates 10,882 YouTube channels, blocks 73 domains, removes 1 Ads account across operations linked to Russia, China, Iran, Romania, Ukraine, Moldova, Indonesia, Cambodia, Chile, and Azerbaijan
• November 13, 2025: Google publishes TAG Bulletin: Q3 2025 detailing enforcement actions across July through September period
• July 2025: Google terminates 9,800+ channels in Q2 2025 coordinated influence operations
• September 2024: Google's TAG disrupts over 13,000 coordinated influence operations in Q3 2024 bulletin
• June 2024: Google removes YouTube channels and blogs tied to disinformation campaigns in Q2 2024
• November 2025: YouTube addresses creator concerns on content moderation and appeals processes

Summary

Who: Google's Threat Analysis Group conducted investigations identifying coordinated influence operations linked to Russia, the People's Republic of China, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Indonesia, Iran, Romania, Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, Philippines, Albania, United Kingdom, Cambodia, and Chile.

What: TAG terminated 18,532 YouTube channels, blocked 109 domains from Google News and Discover surfaces, removed 12 Google Ads accounts, and terminated one Blogger blog during Q3 2025. Operations distributed content in over 15 languages supporting state positions while criticizing opposing governments, with Russian operations involving commercial consulting firms providing coordinated influence services.

When: Enforcement actions occurred throughout July, August, and September 2025, with the bulletin published November 13, 2025. September represented the most intensive enforcement period with 10,882 channel terminations compared to 3,831 in July and 3,819 in August.

Where: Operations targeted multiple regions including Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Poland, Romania), Asia (China, Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia), Middle East (Iran, Turkey, Israel, Palestine), Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia), Latin America (Chile), and the United Kingdom, with content produced in Romanian, Russian, Chinese, English, Azerbaijani, Turkish, Bahasa Indonesian, Arabic, Persian, Hindi, Polish, French, German, Ukrainian, Spanish, Armenian, Uzbek, Farsi, Serbian, Kyrgyz, Portuguese, Tagalog, and Khmer.

Why: TAG's enforcement actions aim to disrupt coordinated inauthentic behavior designed to influence public opinion on geopolitical conflicts, domestic politics, and international relations across Google platforms. The operations threatened platform integrity by distributing coordinated messaging supporting state positions while criticizing opposing governments, with commercial involvement complicating distinctions between legitimate marketing and coordinated manipulation.