UK tribunal rules Apple abused dominant position in app markets

The Competition Appeal Tribunal delivered a comprehensive judgment on October 23, 2025, finding Apple Inc. and Apple Distribution International Ltd. liable for abusing their dominant market position. The case, Dr Rachael Kent v Apple Inc. and Apple Distribution International Ltd., represents one of the most significant antitrust rulings against the technology giant in UK history. The tribunal concluded that Apple's App Store practices violated both section 18 of the Competition Act 1998 and Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU prior to December 31, 2020.

Dr. Rachael Kent brought collective proceedings on behalf of approximately 36 million class members who made purchases through iOS apps between October 1, 2015, and November 15, 2024. The tribunal heard evidence over 28 days between January 13 and February 28, 2025, examining Apple's conduct across two distinct markets: iOS app distribution services and iOS in-app payment services.

According to the 381-page judgment, the tribunal panel found Apple dominant in both markets and determined the company engaged in exclusionary abuses while charging excessive and unfair prices. Ben Tidswell chaired the tribunal alongside William Bishop and Tim Frazer.

The case centered on Apple's requirement that developers distribute iOS apps exclusively through the App Store and use Apple's payment system for in-app purchases. Apple charged a headline commission rate of 30% on most transactions, though this was reduced to 15% under certain circumstances. Dr. Singer, an expert witness for the claimant, estimated Apple's effective commission rate averaged 25.2% over the claim period.

Mark Hoskins KC represented Dr. Kent, while Marie Demetriou KC appeared for Apple. The Competition and Markets Authority participated through counsel Julian Gregory, providing written observations and oral submissions.

The tribunal's market definition analysis proved decisive. Examining iOS app distribution services, the panel determined these services constitute a distinct market separate from Android or other platforms. The tribunal defined iOS app distribution services to include matchmaking between users and developers, distribution of apps and updates, and payment processing services. Similarly, the tribunal established iOS in-app payment services as a separate market encompassing checkout, payment collection, fraud prevention, and subscription management.

Apple contested this narrow market definition. The company argued for a broader systems market that would include the entire iOS ecosystem and cross-platform competition from Android devices. Professor Andrew Sweeting and Professor Lorin Hitt, testifying as Apple's economic experts, supported this interpretation. The tribunal rejected this approach, finding it inconsistent with established competition law principles.

The dominance finding rested on multiple factors. Apple's 100% market share in iOS app distribution created an insurmountable barrier to competition. Developers creating iOS apps had no alternative distribution channel. The tribunal noted that while Apple faced competition from Android in the device market, this did not constrain its conduct in app distribution or payment services. According to the judgment, switching to Android was not a realistic option for most developers given the need to reach iOS users.

Evidence presented during the trial revealed the commercial importance of the iOS platform. Mr. Christian Bailey Owens, who founded Paddle.com, testified about the payment processing industry. His experience demonstrated that developers valued access to iOS users highly enough to accept Apple's terms despite their restrictive nature. The tribunal found this illustrated Apple's market power.

Apple's restrictions on developers appeared in multiple contractual documents. The Developer Program License Agreement required developers to distribute iOS apps exclusively through the App Store. Section 3.3.9 mandated use of Apple's In-App Purchase API for digital content and services. Schedule 2 of the agreement specified Apple's commission structure and appointed Apple as agent or commissionaire for app sales. The tribunal found these provisions foreclosed competition in both relevant markets.

The exclusionary abuse analysis drew on several legal precedents. The tribunal examined the Magill line of cases, which address refusals to supply essential facilities. Apple argued its restrictions fell outside this framework because it provided access to its platform, albeit on restrictive terms. The tribunal disagreed. According to the judgment, Apple's contractual and technical restrictions effectively prevented competition in app distribution and payment services.

Dutch court confirms Apple's antitrust violation in dating apps case provided relevant context for the UK decision. The Rotterdam District Court had already established that Apple's App Store practices constituted an abuse of dominance. That case focused specifically on dating applications, where developers faced the same 30% commission and payment restrictions the UK tribunal examined.

The tribunal considered whether Apple's conduct constituted exclusive dealing abuse. This required showing Apple's restrictions foreclosed substantial competition in the relevant markets. Dr. Hal Singer, testifying for Dr. Kent, presented economic analysis demonstrating the anticompetitive effects. His models showed Apple's restrictions prevented entry by competing app stores and payment processors. The tribunal accepted this evidence, finding Apple's exclusive dealing arrangements harmed competition.

Tying analysis formed another component of the abuse finding. The tribunal examined whether Apple unlawfully tied its payment services to app distribution. Apple's Developer Program License Agreement required developers accepting apps through the App Store to use Apple's payment system for in-app purchases. The tribunal found this constituted unlawful tying that extended Apple's dominance from app distribution into payment services.

The excessive pricing analysis proved particularly complex. The tribunal applied the two-stage test from European case law. Limb 1 examines whether the price charged significantly exceeds costs. Limb 2 assesses whether the price is unfair in itself or when compared to competing products.

Mr. Louis Dudney, a certified public accountant, provided accounting analysis for Dr. Kent. He examined Apple's App Store revenues and costs, calculating returns on assets and capital employed. According to his analysis, Apple's returns substantially exceeded reasonable benchmarks. Dr. Ronnie Barnes testified for Apple, challenging Mr. Dudney's methodology. The tribunal largely preferred Mr. Dudney's approach, though it noted limitations in the available data.

The Limb 1 analysis required allocating revenues and costs to the App Store. Apple's accounting did not separately track App Store profitability, presenting significant challenges. Mr. Kevan Parekh, Apple's Chief Financial Officer, provided evidence about the company's financial structure. The tribunal constructed App Store accounts using this testimony alongside other financial data. The resulting calculations showed Apple earned returns significantly above competitive levels.

Limb 2 required examining whether the price was unfair. The tribunal considered both intrinsic unfairness and comparative benchmarks. Mr. Francesco Burelli, a payment specialist, testified about typical costs for payment processing services. His evidence showed Apple's 30% commission far exceeded industry standards for comparable services. Payment processors typically charged between 2% and 4% for similar services.

Apple defended its commission rate by arguing it reflected the value of tools and technology provided to developers. Mr. Philip Schiller, an Apple Fellow responsible for the App Store, testified extensively about these offerings. He described proprietary frameworks like ARKit for augmented reality development. Mr. Craig Federighi, Apple's senior vice president of software engineering, explained security features Apple provided.

The tribunal rejected this justification. According to the Developer Program License Agreement, developers paid the annual Program Fee as consideration for tools and technology. Clause 8 stated clearly that this £79 fee covered licenses and rights under the agreement. Schedule 2 separately specified that the commission compensated Apple for acting as agent or commissionaire in app distribution and sales. The tribunal found no contractual basis for charging commission for tools and technology.

Apple raised objective justifications for its conduct. The company argued its restrictions served legitimate aims including security, privacy, and user experience. Professor Aviel Rubin, a computer science professor at Johns Hopkins University, testified about iOS security architecture. Dr. Wenke Lee, testifying for Dr. Kent, challenged Apple's security claims.

The tribunal examined whether less restrictive alternatives could achieve Apple's stated objectives. Evidence showed other platforms provided security without prohibiting alternative app stores. Android allowed sideloading while maintaining robust security measures. The tribunal found Apple failed to demonstrate that absolute restrictions were necessary.

Apple faces trial as federal court denies motion to dismiss antitrust lawsuit illustrated the global scrutiny of similar practices. The US Department of Justice filed its case in March 2024, alleging Apple monopolized smartphone markets. That case proceeded to trial after a federal judge denied Apple's dismissal motion on June 30, 2025.

The quantum analysis addressed damages owed to class members. Mr. Derek Holt, an economist at AlixPartners, calculated the overcharge resulting from Apple's conduct. His analysis examined what commission rates would prevail under competitive conditions. Comparing payment processing benchmarks, he estimated competitive rates would range from 2% to 5% for payment services. For app distribution, competitive rates would likely not exceed 10% based on evidence from other platforms.

Professor Andrew Sweeting disputed these calculations for Apple. He argued the counterfactual scenario was inherently uncertain. The tribunal acknowledged uncertainty but found sufficient evidence to estimate damages. Competition law does not require precise calculation when the defendant's conduct prevents establishing exact competitive conditions.

The incidence analysis examined how much of the overcharge passed through to end users. Economic theory suggests firms operating in competitive markets pass through cost increases to consumers. Dr. Singer analyzed App Store pricing data to estimate pass-through rates. His regression analysis showed statistically significant correlations between developer costs and app prices.

Apple challenged these findings through Professor Hitt's testimony. He argued many factors influence app pricing beyond Apple's commission. The tribunal accepted that multiple factors affect pricing decisions but found sufficient evidence of substantial pass-through. The judgment noted that even partial pass-through to millions of consumers justified collective proceedings.

Total damages claimed range from £1.184 billion to £2.237 billion including interest. Individual class members' recoverable amounts average between £27 and £75. These relatively small individual sums illustrated the importance of collective proceedings mechanisms for addressing consumer harm from competition violations.

The tribunal considered Apple's argument that the Program Fee covered tools and technology. Mr. Trystan Kosmynka, senior director of App Review, provided evidence about Apple's app review process. His testimony described static analysis, dynamic analysis, and manual review procedures. The tribunal found these services valuable but concluded they were separately compensated through the Program Fee.

Multiple regulatory proceedings informed the tribunal's analysis. The Competition and Markets Authority conducted an extensive Mobile Ecosystems Market Study published in June 2022. That study examined competition in mobile browsers, cloud gaming, and app distribution. According to the MEM Study, Apple's restrictions significantly limited competition.

The European Commission issued decisions addressing similar conduct. The Commission fined Apple €1.8 billion in the Spotify case for App Store practices that restricted music streaming competition. Another decision addressed Google's Android operating system, finding similar exclusionary conduct. The tribunal cited these decisions as relevant context though not binding precedent.

Dutch court confirms Apple's antitrust violation in dating apps case provided particularly relevant precedent. The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets ordered Apple to permit alternative payment systems for dating apps. When Apple's compliance proved inadequate, the authority imposed €50 million in penalties. The Rotterdam District Court upheld this enforcement on June 16, 2025.

The Digital Markets Act introduced new obligations for Apple in the European Union. This regulation designated Apple as a gatekeeper and required allowing alternative app distribution methods. Apple's response included introducing new fee structures that maintained significant charges on developers. Multiple parties challenged whether these changes genuinely complied with the regulation's requirements.

Apple revises App Store rules for EU: external purchase links expanded detailed these modifications. The changes permitted developers to include external purchase links but maintained commission charges on those transactions. Announced on August 8, 2024, these revisions took effect in fall 2024.

South Korea enacted legislation requiring platform operators to permit alternative payment systems. Apple introduced changes allowing developers to offer third-party payment options but imposed a 26% commission on those transactions. This maintained the economic incentive for developers to use Apple's system despite nominal choice.

Japan's Fair Trade Commission investigated App Store practices and reached a settlement with Apple. The agreement required changes to the Reader Rule, allowing certain app categories to direct users to external websites. These modifications took effect globally rather than only in Japan.

Google ordered to open Android App Store in antitrust ruling provided instructive comparison. A federal judge ordered Google to allow third-party app stores access to the Google Play catalog on October 7, 2024. That decision mandated significant structural remedies following Epic Games' successful antitrust litigation.

The contrast between the iOS and Android ecosystems featured prominently in evidence. Android permitted sideloading and alternative app stores despite Google's preference for the Play Store. iOS prohibited both practices absolutely. Apple argued this reflected different security philosophies. The tribunal found the Android example demonstrated viable alternatives existed.

Security expert testimony diverged sharply. Professor Rubin maintained that Apple's integrated approach provided superior security. Dr. Lee testified that well-designed alternatives could achieve equivalent security without prohibiting competition. The tribunal found Apple's security concerns legitimate but concluded absolute restrictions were disproportionate.

Mr. Federighi described Apple's defense-in-depth security model. This approach employed multiple overlapping security layers. App Review screened for malware and policy violations. Code signing verified app authenticity. Sandboxing limited apps' access to system resources. The tribunal acknowledged these measures' effectiveness but questioned whether they required prohibiting all alternative distribution.

Payment security received particular attention. Apple argued its integrated payment system protected users from fraud and unauthorized charges. Mr. Burelli testified that third-party payment processors provided equivalent protections. Services like Stripe and PayPal processed billions of transactions securely without Apple's restrictions.

The tribunal examined Apple's Small Business Program introduced in January 2021. This program reduced commission to 15% for developers earning less than $1 million annually. Professor Hitt argued this demonstrated Apple's responsiveness to developer concerns. Dr. Singer countered that this merely reduced exploitation of smaller developers without addressing the underlying competition issues.

Auto-renewable subscriptions received preferential treatment under Apple's commission structure. After one year of paid subscription, the commission rate dropped to 15% for subsequent renewals. Apple argued this incentivized quality apps that retained subscribers. The tribunal found this pricing structure still substantially exceeded competitive levels.

The Video Partner Program offered 15% commission to approved partners integrating with Apple technologies. Qualification required implementing Universal Search, Siri integration, and AirPlay support. The tribunal viewed this as conditioning lower commission on accepting additional Apple control rather than genuine competitive pricing.

Reader apps received exemptions allowing purchases outside the app without commission. This category included books, music, and video content. The exemption reflected Apple's recognition that commission on these transactions was commercially unviable. The tribunal noted this demonstrated Apple's ability to adjust its model when competitive pressure existed.

Apple's App Tracking Transparency: A Deep Dive into the €150M Fine and Recent Developments demonstrated regulatory scrutiny extended beyond App Store practices. The French Competition Authority fined Apple €150 million on March 30, 2025, for anticompetitive implementation of its App Tracking Transparency framework.

The UK judgment addressed interest on damages. The tribunal considered appropriate rates and compounding methods. Claimants requested compound interest reflecting the time value of money over the decade-long claim period. The tribunal found this approach appropriate given the extended timeframe and substantial sums involved.

Consequential matters remained for later determination. These included specific quantum calculations for individual class members, distribution mechanisms, and costs. The tribunal indicated it would address these issues through supplemental proceedings.

Witness credibility proved important to several findings. Mr. Schiller demonstrated extensive knowledge of Apple's business but showed strong loyalty to the company's interests. Mr. Parekh provided clear financial testimony that the tribunal found helpful. Mr. Howell offered straightforward evidence about the developer experience.

Expert witness performance varied considerably. Dr. Singer impressed the tribunal with his comprehensive grasp of complex economic issues despite occasional uncooperative moments. Professor Hitt troubled the tribunal by acting as Apple's advocate rather than providing independent expert analysis. The tribunal specifically noted several instances where Professor Hitt ignored inconvenient evidence or maintained obviously incorrect positions.

The documentary evidence proved extensive. Trial bundles contained hundreds of pages beyond the written expert reports. Email communications between Apple executives revealed strategic thinking about App Store policies. A 2010 email from Steve Jobs stated Apple's strategy aimed to "tie all of our products together, so we further lock customers into our ecosystem."

The tribunal's market definition methodology followed established principles. The hypothetical monopolist test examines whether a profit-maximizing firm would impose a small but significant non-transitory increase in price. Dr. Singer conducted SSNIP analysis showing Apple could profitably maintain elevated commission rates even if developers could switch platforms.

Apple challenged the SSNIP methodology as circular. The company argued the test assumed the relevant market rather than deriving it from economic analysis. The tribunal rejected this argument, finding Dr. Singer's analysis properly applied accepted economic techniques.

Price dispersion evidence supported the market definition. Dr. Singer demonstrated that commission rates varied widely across platforms and services. This dispersion indicated imperfect substitution between iOS and Android app distribution. The tribunal found this evidence corroborated the narrow market definition.

Counting the zeros provided additional support. This method examines the number of zero-commission transactions as evidence of market separation. Apple charged commission on paid apps and in-app purchases but not on free apps without purchases. The tribunal found this pricing structure indicated distinct markets for different service types.

Regulatory decisions internationally influenced the tribunal's analysis. While not binding, these decisions provided relevant comparisons. The European Commission, Dutch authority, and various other jurisdictions had reached similar conclusions about Apple's market power and anticompetitive conduct.

The judgment distinguished between Apple's device competition and app market dominance. Apple faced vigorous competition from Android in smartphone sales. This competition constrained iPhone pricing and features. However, device competition did not prevent Apple from exercising dominance over iOS app distribution. Users who purchased iPhones became locked into Apple's ecosystem for app acquisition.

Network effects reinforced Apple's position. Developers needed to reach iOS users, creating demand for App Store access. Users benefited from app availability, creating demand for devices with extensive app catalogs. This two-sided market dynamic made entry by competing app stores particularly difficult.

The tribunal rejected Apple's systems market theory. This theory posited that consumers purchased integrated systems combining hardware, operating system, and app access. Under this view, competition occurred between iOS and Android systems rather than within iOS app distribution. The tribunal found this approach inconsistent with how consumers and developers actually behaved.

Mr. Owens' testimony about Paddle's business model proved informative. Paddle provided merchant-of-record services to software developers, handling payment processing, tax compliance, and subscription management. His evidence demonstrated that specialized providers could offer these services efficiently at rates far below Apple's commission.

The tribunal's abuse analysis synthesized multiple theories of harm. Exclusive dealing prevented entry by competing app stores. Tying extended dominance from app distribution into payment processing. Excessive pricing exploited users who lacked alternatives. Together, these abuses harmed both developers and end users.

The quantum methodology required constructing counterfactual scenarios. What commission rates would prevail absent Apple's anticompetitive conduct? Mr. Holt examined evidence from analogous markets. Gaming console platforms charged 30% commission but faced competition from other consoles and PC gaming. Payment processors charged 2-4% without additional distribution services.

The tribunal concluded competitive iOS app distribution commission would likely range from 5-10%. This figure reflected costs of hosting, bandwidth, payment processing, and fraud prevention. Payment services alone justified commission of 2-5% based on industry benchmarks.

Apple's actual 25.2% average commission substantially exceeded these competitive levels. The difference represented overcharge resulting from anticompetitive conduct. Multiplied by transaction volume over the claim period, this generated damages in the billions.

Evidence about alternative monetisation options received consideration. Developers could offer free apps supported by advertising. They could sell physical goods through apps without paying commission. They could direct users to external websites for subscription signup. The tribunal noted these alternatives' existence but found them insufficient to prevent the abuse finding.

The advertising model suited certain app categories but not others. Productivity apps and utilities typically could not generate sufficient advertising revenue. Gaming apps relied heavily on in-app purchases for monetization. Physical goods apps avoided commission but represented a small fraction of App Store transactions.

The tribunal examined Apple's arguments about free riding. The company contended that developers benefited from App Store services even when using external payment methods. Therefore, commission on externally processed payments was justified. The tribunal rejected this reasoning, finding the argument would justify charging commission indefinitely regardless of Apple's actual role in transactions.

Class certification issues had been resolved in earlier proceedings. The tribunal granted a Collective Proceedings Order in June 2022, permitting Dr. Kent to represent the class. Certification examined commonality of issues, adequacy of representation, and preferability of collective proceedings over individual actions.

The relatively small individual damages made collective proceedings essential. Few consumers would pursue £30-70 claims individually. Collective proceedings enabled recovery while deterring future anticompetitive conduct. This aligned with the legislative purpose behind the collective proceedings regime.

Privacy company Proton joins antitrust challenge against Apple's App Store policies demonstrated ongoing challenges to Apple's practices. Proton filed a class action lawsuit in US federal court on June 30, 2025, alleging similar anticompetitive conduct. The complaint cited the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal's analysis as relevant authority.

The UK judgment's impact extends beyond the immediate parties. It establishes precedent for analyzing digital platform competition issues. The market definition methodology, dominance assessment, and abuse theories provide frameworks for future cases. Other jurisdictions examining similar practices may draw on the tribunal's analysis.

Apple indicated it would appeal the judgment. The company maintained that its practices promoted security, privacy, and quality. An Apple spokesperson stated the company believes the decision misapplies competition law to a competitive market. Appeals would proceed to the Court of Appeal.

The marketing and advertising implications merit attention. Apple rebrands Search Ads business as 'Apple Ads' amid expansion examined Apple's growing advertising ambitions. Announced on April 14, 2025, this rebrand reflected Apple's expanding ad business beyond App Store search. The tribunal's finding of dominance in app distribution raises questions about whether Apple's advertising leverage creates additional competition concerns.

Attribution and measurement face particular challenges in iOS after App Tracking Transparency implementation. Apple's €150 million ATT fine highlights privilege disparities in digital advertising explored how Apple's privacy framework affected competing advertisers differently than Apple's own services. The French regulator found this asymmetry constituted an abuse of dominance.

The interaction between privacy requirements and competition law emerged as a significant issue. Apple legitimately pursued privacy objectives through App Tracking Transparency and other measures. However, implementation methods that unnecessarily disadvantaged competitors violated competition law. This principle established that dominant platforms must pursue legitimate objectives through proportionate means.

For developers and marketers, the judgment signals potential changes to iOS monetization strategies. If alternative payment systems become permissible without punitive commission charges, developers gain flexibility in pricing and payment methods. This could affect campaign economics and user acquisition costs.

App Store optimization strategies may evolve if competing app stores emerge. Developers currently optimize for Apple's search algorithms and ranking factors. Alternative stores would introduce different discovery mechanisms. Marketing professionals would need to develop multi-store distribution strategies comparable to current iOS-Android approaches.

Performance marketing measurement could improve with greater competition. Apple's privacy measures restricted certain attribution capabilities. Competing platforms might offer different privacy-preserving measurement solutions. Developers and advertisers would benefit from multiple technical approaches to solving attribution challenges.

The judgment's unanimous nature strengthened its precedential value. All three tribunal members concurred in the findings. The 381-page decision demonstrated thorough analysis of complex factual and legal issues. This reduces the likelihood of reversal on appeal.

The trial's efficiency impressed observers. Four years from filing to judgment for such a complex case represented relatively swift progress. The 28-day trial accommodated extensive evidence while maintaining focus on key issues. This demonstrated the Competition Appeal Tribunal's capability to handle sophisticated competition litigation.

Collective proceedings continue gaining importance as vehicles for competition law enforcement. Alongside public enforcement by regulators, private actions provide additional deterrence and victim compensation. The UK judgment illustrated collective proceedings' potential to address digital platform competition issues affecting millions of consumers.

The case establishes several important principles for digital platform regulation. Dominant platforms cannot prohibit competing distribution channels without objective justification. They cannot tie separate services together to extend dominance. They cannot charge excessive prices that substantially exceed competitive levels. These principles will inform future regulatory and judicial approaches to platform governance.

Timeline

Key dates in Apple's App Store antitrust challenges:

• October 1, 2015: Claim period begins for UK collective proceedings
• May 2021: Dr. Rachael Kent files collective proceedings in UK Competition Appeal Tribunal
• August 24, 2021: Dutch ACM issues initial order requiring Apple to adjust App Store conditions for dating apps
• June 2022: UK Competition Appeal Tribunal grants Collective Proceedings Order
• August 1, 2024: Apple updates App Store review guidelines, clarifying rules for emulators
• August 8, 2024: Apple revises App Store rules for EU: external purchase links expanded
• October 7, 2024: Google ordered to open Android App Store in antitrust ruling
• March 30, 2025: French Competition Authority fines Apple €150 million for ATT framework
• April 14, 2025: Apple rebrands Search Ads business as 'Apple Ads' amid expansion
• June 16, 2025: Dutch court confirms Apple's antitrust violation in dating apps case
• June 30, 2025: Apple faces trial as federal court denies motion to dismiss US DOJ antitrust lawsuit
• June 30, 2025: Privacy company Proton joins antitrust challenge against Apple's App Store policies
• January 13-February 28, 2025: Trial proceedings held in UK Competition Appeal Tribunal
• October 23, 2025: UK Competition Appeal Tribunal issues judgment finding Apple liable for abuse of dominance
• November 15, 2024: Claim period ends for UK collective proceedings

Summary

Who: Dr. Rachael Kent brought collective proceedings on behalf of approximately 36 million UK class members against Apple Inc. and Apple Distribution International Ltd. The Competition Appeal Tribunal panel consisted of Ben Tidswell (Chair), William Bishop, and Tim Frazer. Mark Hoskins KC represented Dr. Kent, while Marie Demetriou KC appeared for Apple.

What: The Competition Appeal Tribunal ruled that Apple abused its dominant position in iOS app distribution services and iOS in-app payment services markets. The tribunal found Apple violated section 18 of the Competition Act 1998 and Article 102 TFEU through exclusionary practices and excessive pricing. Apple's requirements that developers distribute apps exclusively through the App Store and use Apple's payment system for in-app purchases constituted unlawful exclusive dealing and tying. The headline 30% commission rate was found to be excessive and unfair.

When: The judgment was issued on October 23, 2025, following a 28-day trial held between January 13 and February 28, 2025. The claim period covered October 1, 2015, through November 15, 2024. The case was filed in May 2021, and the Collective Proceedings Order was granted in June 2022.

Where: The case was heard in the Competition Appeal Tribunal in England and Wales at Salisbury Square House, London. The judgment applies to conduct affecting UK consumers who purchased apps or made in-app purchases on iOS devices during the claim period.

Why: The tribunal determined Apple's practices harmed competition and consumers. Prohibiting alternative app stores prevented competition in app distribution. Requiring use of Apple's payment system prevented competition in payment processing. The 30% commission substantially exceeded competitive levels, with expert evidence showing competitive rates would range from 2-5% for payment services and 5-10% for app distribution. Total damages claimed range from £1.184 billion to £2.237 billion, with individual class members' claims averaging £27 to £75. The judgment aims to provide redress to affected consumers and deter future anticompetitive conduct.