Berlin court rules 1,099 hotels can claim damages from Booking.com

The Regional Court Berlin II confirmed on December 16, 2025, that Booking.com BV and its German subsidiary Booking.com (Deutschland) GmbH must compensate 1,099 hotel operators for damages caused by unlawful best price clauses implemented between January 1, 2013, and January 31, 2016. The judgment establishes liability for practices that the court determined "contributed to a considerable market foreclosure and oligopolization of the market," according to Till Schreiber, Managing Director at CDC Cartel Damage Claims Consulting, who announced the decision on LinkedIn.

The ruling addresses claims from 1,288 plaintiffs seeking declaratory judgments on compensation entitlements rather than specific monetary awards. Chamber 61 of the Regional Court Berlin II found that both the wide best price clauses used until June 30, 2015, and the narrow clauses employed between July 1, 2015, and January 31, 2016, violated European competition law by restricting accommodation operators' pricing freedom.

According to the court's press release issued December 16, Booking.com BV operates a booking platform where it receives commission for each non-cancellable accommodation booking, calculated as a percentage of the overnight price. The company's German subsidiary handles relationships with German contract partners on the platform.

Two types of restrictive clauses examined

The court examined two distinct types of pricing restrictions that Booking.com imposed on accommodation providers through contractual agreements. From the mid-2000s until June 30, 2015, the platform used so-called wide best price clauses requiring accommodation operators to offer their properties on Booking.com at the best available prices and conditions when compared across all distribution channels. These clauses prevented hotels from offering better rates through their own websites, competing online travel agencies, or any other sales method.

Starting July 1, 2015, Booking.com switched to narrow best price clauses. These modified restrictions still prohibited accommodation operators from offering cheaper prices through direct sales to travelers compared to rates listed on Booking.com. The Federal Cartel Office determined on December 22, 2015, that these narrow clauses violated cartel law and ordered their removal by January 31, 2016. The Federal Court of Justice upheld this decision on May 18, 2021, in case KVR 54/20, BGHZ 230, 88.

The court found that best price clauses eliminated accommodation operators' ability to utilize an obvious pricing strategy: passing commission savings directly to customers. Booking.com typically charges commissions ranging from 10 to 15 percent of room prices, according to the judgment. Hotels could not use these savings to offer lower direct booking rates as an incentive for customers.

These contractual restrictions also impaired operators' capacity management strategies. Hotels wanting to sell remaining capacity through last-minute price reductions faced constraints because matching price cuts on Booking.com would require paying full commissions on the reduced rates, substantially limiting their markdown flexibility and revenue optimization opportunities.

European Court of Justice precedent establishes foundation

The December 16 judgment follows a September 19, 2024, decision by the European Court of Justice confirming that Booking.com's parity clauses violated European competition law. That ruling validated claims that these contractual restrictions disadvantaged hotels competitively, paralyzed price competition between Booking.com and other online booking platforms, and restrained hotels' direct distribution channels.

Under general principles of European competition law, hotels are entitled to claim compensation from Booking.com for financial losses suffered due to anticompetitive practices. Preliminary estimates suggest hotels might recover up to 30 percent or more of total commissions paid to Booking.com since 2004, plus interest, according to background materials from the collective action coordinated by HOTREC, the European hotel association umbrella organization.

The Berlin court's reasoning addressed a procedural question regarding whether declaratory relief was appropriate when plaintiffs could have filed quantified damage claims instead. Courts typically require plaintiffs to pursue specific monetary claims rather than declarations of liability, particularly when calculating damages involves significant effort and expense.

However, the chamber concluded that declaratory actions remain permissible when damage development has not concluded at the time of filing, making final quantification impossible. The plaintiffs argued that best price clause usage contributed to substantial market foreclosure and oligopolization whose effects persisted beyond the period when Booking.com actually employed the clauses. These continuing structural market impacts suggested ongoing harm to hotel operators, justifying declaratory relief rather than requiring immediate damage quantification.

Broader claims for commission refunds rejected

The lawsuit sought not only declarations of compensation liability for best price clause damages but also determinations that Booking.com must refund booking commissions received between January 2006 and February 2025 to the extent those commissions were excessive due to unlawful pricing restrictions.

The court dismissed these broader refund claims as inadmissible. According to the judgment, commissions already paid represent completed transactions that plaintiffs must address through quantified payment claims rather than declaratory actions. The distinction matters procedurally because declaratory judgments establish legal principles without specifying exact monetary amounts, while payment claims require precise calculation of damages owed.

Additionally, 70 claims failed because plaintiffs did not provide proper evidence of attorney authorization. Another 118 plaintiffs could not demonstrate that Booking.com's cartel violations actually affected their businesses. One case was dismissed for other procedural reasons.

Together for compensation against booking.com

Did your hotel receive guests via Booking.com between 2004 and 2024? Register your claim now.

Commission structures and platform dominance

Booking.com's business model centers on commission-based revenue from accommodation bookings facilitated through its platform. The company operates as either agent or principal depending on contractual arrangements detailed in Schedule 2 of agreements with accommodation providers. Section 3.3.9 of those contracts mandated use of Apple's In-App Purchase API for digital content and services, establishing technical and contractual restrictions that the court found foreclosed competition in both app distribution and payment services markets.

The platform's market position raises questions similar to those examined in other digital marketplace antitrust cases. The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal found Apple violated competition law through App Store practices including 30 percent commission rates in a judgment issued October 23, 2025. Privacy company Proton joined antitrust challenges against Apple's App Store policies through a class-action lawsuit filed June 30, 2025, alleging illegal monopolies in app distribution and payment processing markets.

European regulators have increasingly scrutinized dominant platforms' pricing practices and contractual restrictions. The Commission imposed a €2.95 billion fine on Google in September 2025 for advertising technology violations. French regulators fined Doctolib €4.66 million for antitrust violations in November 2025, addressing practices preventing healthcare providers from using competing services through contract restrictions.

Pan-European implications for hotel industry

The Berlin judgment establishes precedent that could influence damage claims across Europe given Booking.com's widespread use of identical best price clauses throughout the continent. Over 25 national hotel associations across Europe support a collective action initiative allowing affected hotels to participate without cost or financial risk.

The initiative operates through Stichting Hotel Claims Alliance in the Netherlands, where Booking.com BV maintains its headquarters. Centralized proceedings in Dutch courts offer procedural advantages including consistent application of liability findings across multiple countries' hotel claims. Article 4(1) and Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 permit damage actions at defendants' domiciles regardless of where plaintiffs operate their businesses.

Hotels that received guests through Booking.com between 2004 and 2024 may be eligible for compensation. The registration process requires hotels to download invoices from the Booking.com Extranet platform and sign assignment agreements transferring claims to Stichting Hotel Claims Alliance. The foundation pursues claims on behalf of registered hotels, which face no investment requirements, cost risks, or adverse cost exposure from litigation.

Several thousand hotels have already registered for the collective action, according to materials describing the initiative. Participation remains open to additional accommodation providers who can demonstrate they paid commissions to Booking.com during the relevant period and were subject to best price clause restrictions.

Competitive dynamics in online travel distribution

Best price clauses fundamentally altered competitive dynamics in online travel distribution by preventing accommodation providers from offering differentiated pricing across distribution channels. The restrictions eliminated natural competitive responses to commission structures that online travel agencies impose.

Direct bookings through hotel websites avoid the 10 to 15 percent commissions that platforms like Booking.com charge. Without best price clause restrictions, hotels could share these savings with customers through lower direct booking rates, creating price-based incentives for consumers to book directly rather than through commission-charging intermediaries. Price competition between direct channels and online travel agencies would theoretically benefit consumers through lower average prices while allowing hotels to retain larger revenue shares on direct bookings.

The clauses also restricted hotels' tactical pricing flexibility for capacity management. Hotels routinely adjust pricing based on occupancy forecasts, seasonal demand patterns, and remaining inventory. Last-minute discounts help fill otherwise vacant rooms, generating revenue that covers variable costs even if it doesn't fully cover fixed expenses. Best price clauses forced hotels to match any direct discount on Booking.com, where commission obligations on discounted rates reduced profitability of last-minute inventory clearance strategies.

Competition enforcement across multiple sectors has increasingly addressed similar vertical restraints where dominant platforms impose contractual restrictions limiting business users' commercial freedom. Italian authorities opened antitrust proceedings against Meta for excluding rival AI chatbot providers from WhatsApp, alleging abuse of dominant position through contractual conditions prohibiting competing AI services.

Ongoing litigation and enforcement timelines

The December 16 judgment is not final. Both parties can appeal to the Kammergericht within one month of receiving the full written decision. The case number is 61 O 60/24 Kart. Appeals could extend final resolution by additional years depending on whether appellate courts accept cases and how they rule on legal questions presented.

Meanwhile, the collective action in the Netherlands proceeds independently of German court decisions. The Dutch litigation benefits from the European Court of Justice ruling establishing that Booking.com's parity clauses violated competition law across all member states. This creates legally binding effect in civil courts throughout the European Union under Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Determining actual damage amounts requires extensive analysis of counterfactual scenarios: what would hotels have earned absent the anticompetitive restrictions? Economic experts must model alternative pricing strategies, estimate direct booking volumes under competitive conditions, and calculate commission savings that could have been realized. Individual hotel damages depend on specific booking volumes, commission rates paid, and competitive positioning during affected periods.

The collective action model addresses these analytical challenges by pooling resources across thousands of hotels, enabling comprehensive economic analysis and legal representation that individual accommodation providers could not afford independently. The foundation coordinates expert witnesses, manages litigation costs, and negotiates potential settlements on behalf of all registered hotels.

Regulatory context and enforcement trends

Competition enforcement targeting digital platforms has intensified across multiple jurisdictions. The Competition and Markets Authority opened investigations into eight firms over online pricing practices in November 2025, marking the first enforcement cases under new powers granted by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024.

The Federal Trade Commission launched initiatives to tackle anticompetitive regulations with the Department of Justice Antitrust Division in May 2025, implementing Executive Order 14267 on Reducing Anticompetitive Regulatory Barriers. Federal agencies face requirements to identify regulations that reduce competition, entrepreneurship, and innovation.

Publishing giant Dotdash Meredith sued Google for antitrust violations in August 2025, alleging monopolistic control of digital advertising technology caused substantial financial harm. The 88-page complaint centers on Google's control of critical advertising technology infrastructure that publishers depend on to monetize content.

DuckDuckGo CEO criticized Google antitrust remedies as insufficient in September 2025, arguing that behavioral remedies fail to prevent Google from leveraging monopoly position to suppress competition. The criticism followed U.S. District Judge Amit Mehta's September 2, 2025 ruling rejecting demands for Google to divest Chrome browser while implementing behavioral remedies.

The Booking.com case exemplifies broader regulatory attention to vertical restraints that dominant platforms impose on dependent business users. Hotels require visibility on major booking platforms to reach consumers effectively, creating dependency relationships that platforms can exploit through contractual restrictions limiting competitive alternatives.

Economic implications for accommodation sector

The judgment's practical impact depends on eventual damage calculations and whether appeals succeed. Even if liability stands, individual hotel recovery amounts remain uncertain until economic experts complete detailed analyses of harm suffered.

Hotels operating during the best price clause period experienced multiple forms of potential harm. Direct revenue losses occurred when hotels paid commissions on bookings that could have been captured directly at higher margins without platform intermediation. Market structure changes from reduced competition among booking platforms may have elevated commission rates above levels that would have prevailed in more competitive markets.

Longer-term strategic impacts affected hotels' ability to develop direct booking channels and customer relationships. Best price clauses discouraged investment in direct booking infrastructure because hotels could not leverage those investments through differentiated pricing. Customer relationship development suffered when platform policies prevented hotels from incentivizing repeat bookings through direct channel loyalty programs.

The tourism and hospitality sector faces ongoing challenges from platform intermediation that extends beyond price parity clauses to encompass data access, customer relationship ownership, and revenue management flexibility. Online travel agencies control substantial customer data that accommodation providers cannot access, limiting hotels' ability to develop targeted marketing strategies and personalized service offerings.

Cross-border enforcement coordination

The Booking.com litigation demonstrates growing coordination in cross-border competition enforcement. National competition authorities increasingly reference decisions from other jurisdictions when evaluating similar practices. The German Federal Cartel Office's 2015 prohibition decision cited concerns about market foreclosure and pricing restrictions that aligned with analyses conducted by competition authorities in France, Italy, and Sweden regarding online platform pricing practices.

European Union competition law provides harmonized legal standards across member states through Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. These provisions prohibit agreements restricting competition and abuse of dominant market positions respectively. The European Court of Justice interprets these provisions uniformly across all member states, creating consistent legal frameworks for evaluating anticompetitive conduct.

However, enforcement remains partially fragmented between European Commission proceedings addressing conduct affecting trade between member states and national competition authority cases focused on domestic market impacts. The Booking.com case proceeded through national German courts rather than European Commission administrative proceedings, demonstrating that significant competition cases can advance through member state judicial systems.

Private enforcement through damage claims complements public enforcement by competition authorities. While authorities focus on prohibiting anticompetitive conduct and imposing fines, private plaintiffs seek compensation for actual economic harm suffered. Directive 2014/104/EU harmonized rules governing antitrust damage actions across the European Union, facilitating private enforcement as a complement to public competition policy.

Digital platform accountability frameworks

The Booking.com judgment arrives amid broader efforts to establish accountability frameworks for digital platforms. The Digital Markets Act, which took effect in November 2022, imposes ex-ante obligations on designated gatekeepers to prevent leveraging market power into adjacent markets. The regulation prohibits specific practices including requiring business users to use designated gatekeepers' identification services.

Expert analysis calls for structured DMA cooperation to prevent market fragmentation as European regulators assess the regulation's first formal review. Dr. Christophe Carugati submitted a detailed 38-page analysis on September 10, 2025, evaluating designation, compliance, and cooperation frameworks since enforcement began in September 2023.

The Digital Services Act complements the Digital Markets Act by establishing content moderation obligations, transparency requirements, and risk assessment duties for online platforms. Together, these regulations create comprehensive frameworks governing platform conduct beyond traditional competition law's prohibition of specific anticompetitive practices.

Online travel agencies fall within the scope of these regulatory frameworks when they meet designated gatekeeper thresholds or qualify as very large online platforms. The regulations impose obligations regarding data portability, interoperability, and business user rights that extend beyond competition law's traditional focus on preventing abuse of dominant positions.

Future outlook for platform-business relations

The Berlin judgment signals continued judicial scrutiny of contractual restrictions that dominant platforms impose on dependent business users. Courts increasingly recognize that formal contract freedom may mask economic compulsion when business users lack viable alternatives to platform participation.

Accommodation providers cannot realistically opt out of major booking platforms given consumers' booking preferences and platforms' network effects. This dependency creates power imbalances that platforms can exploit through restrictive contractual terms that individual hotels lack practical ability to negotiate.

Competition law addresses these power imbalances by prohibiting specific practices when employed by undertakings holding dominant market positions. The key legal question involves distinguishing legitimate business practices from abusive conduct that harms competition. Not all contractual restrictions violate competition law; only those imposed by dominant undertakings that restrict competition without legitimate business justification face prohibition.

The Booking.com case demonstrates that pricing restrictions preventing business users from competing with platforms through direct sales channels raise competition concerns. Courts found that best price clauses lacked legitimate justification and instead served to protect Booking.com's commission-based business model from competitive pressure that direct booking channels would otherwise create.

Similar reasoning could extend to other vertical restraints in digital platform contexts. Exclusive dealing arrangements, tying practices, and refusals to deal may all face scrutiny when imposed by dominant platforms on dependent business users. The specific competitive effects and business justifications require fact-intensive analysis in each case.

Timeline

• Mid-2000s: Booking.com begins using wide best price clauses requiring accommodation providers to offer best available prices across all distribution channels
• January 1, 2013: Period covered by damage claims begins
• June 30, 2015: Booking.com transitions from wide to narrow best price clauses
• July 1, 2015: Narrow best price clauses take effect, restricting only direct sales pricing
• December 22, 2015: German Federal Cartel Office rules narrow best price clauses violate cartel law and orders removal by January 31, 2016
• January 31, 2016: Booking.com must remove narrow best price clauses per Federal Cartel Office order
• May 18, 2021: Federal Court of Justice upholds Federal Cartel Office decision in case KVR 54/20, BGHZ 230, 88
• September 19, 2024: European Court of Justice confirms Booking.com's parity clauses violated European competition law
• December 16, 2025: Regional Court Berlin II rules Booking.com must compensate 1,099 hotels for damages from unlawful best price clauses

Summary

Who: Regional Court Berlin II issued judgment affecting Booking.com BV, Booking.com (Deutschland) GmbH, and 1,099 German accommodation operators who filed declaratory damage claims. Chamber 61 examined claims from 1,288 total plaintiffs represented by legal counsel in cartel damage proceedings.

What: The court declared that both defendants must compensate accommodation operators for damages caused by anticompetitive best price clauses employed between January 1, 2013, and January 31, 2016. The judgment established liability without quantifying specific damage amounts, requiring plaintiffs to prove actual harm and causation in subsequent proceedings. Wide best price clauses until June 30, 2015, and narrow clauses through January 31, 2016, both violated competition law by restricting accommodation operators' pricing freedom across distribution channels.

When: The December 16, 2025, judgment addresses conduct spanning January 1, 2013, through January 31, 2016, when Booking.com maintained contractual best price restrictions. The Federal Cartel Office prohibited narrow clauses on December 22, 2015, effective January 31, 2016, establishing the endpoint for damages claims. The European Court of Justice confirmed clause illegality on September 19, 2024, providing legal foundation for German civil damage claims.

Where: The Regional Court Berlin II issued its decision in Germany, but implications extend across Europe given Booking.com's continent-wide use of identical contractual restrictions. The case number 61 O 60/24 Kart proceeds in German jurisdiction while parallel collective actions advance in Netherlands courts where Booking.com BV maintains headquarters at Herengracht 597, 1017 CE Amsterdam.

Why: Best price clauses eliminated accommodation operators' ability to offer differentiated pricing across distribution channels, preventing hotels from passing commission savings to customers through direct booking incentives. The restrictions limited capacity management flexibility by forcing hotels to match direct discounts on Booking.com despite commission obligations on reduced rates. Courts found the clauses contributed to market foreclosure and oligopolization whose effects persisted beyond the period of actual clause usage, justifying continued damage claims for ongoing structural market harm.